The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency
Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of
Americans Invest in the Market
Anne Tucker*
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENCY PARADIGM
Corporate law can seem obsessed with the internal operations of a
corporation,1 often ignoring external realities. The underlying assumption
is that if corporations are operating correctly internally, then they generate external benefits for markets, consumers, communities, and other
stakeholders.2 Focusing on the internal operations can insulate corporate
law theories, like the agency paradigm, from the changing economic realities of how and why individuals invest.
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1. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
805–806 (2011) (“The problems with the existing board structure are significant, however, and matter very much to the extent they impede the ability of corporate investors to constrain the agency
costs inherent in the corporate form. The goal of reducing those agency costs has been the preoccupation of corporate law and scholarship for at least the last eighty years.”).
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper Series 1-12, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1615838 (explaining director primacy theory as one view of how corporations are internally organized and the benefits of such a model). As Lucian Bebchuk explains,
Some supporters of greater shareholder power might regard increases in “shareholder
voice” and “corporate democracy” as intrinsically desirable. I should therefore stress at
the outset that I do not view increasing shareholder power as an end in and of itself. Rather, effective corporate governance, which enhances shareholder and firm value, is the
objective underlying my analysis.
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843
(2005). For a definition of stakeholders, see infra note 251.
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The agency paradigm is premised on two actors: managers and
shareholders.3 It aims to prevent managers from acting in their own interests rather than in the interests of shareholders.4 It seeks to reduce conflicts of interest by striking the appropriate balance between the authority
of managers and the interests of shareholders.5 The larger the pool of
shareholders, however, the more attenuated the shareholders’ link to
managers becomes because the voice or vote of each shareholder is diluted relative to the size of the whole pool.6 For example, one shareholder’s vote out of ten total votes has more potential influence than one
shareholder’s vote out of 10,000 or 10 million votes. Berle and Means
captured this problem with their famous phrase: “the separation of ownership from control.”7
From the agency paradigm was born the corporate law litmus test
of whether corporate actions serve the interests of shareholders.8 The
3. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 125, 135–36 (2011) (discussing the role of shareholders and corporate managers in the
agency paradigm and recent proposals to achieve the appropriate power balance).
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 2096.30 (2011) (discussing the separation of ownership and control as a foundational theory in corporate law).
5. This tension between the owners and who is in control of a corporation is at the heart of
corporate law debates and is a starting point from which many theories diverge. Lynn A. Stout,
Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS.
LAW. 1435, 1445 (“The principal−agent model has so dominated academic discussions of corporate
law . . . .”); see also Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to
Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 846 (2009) (“[M]uch of corporate governance work focuses on that power balance between management and owners, and seeks to find ways
to enhance shareholders’ rights. Or, the work looks to the failure of the board of directors to look out
for shareholders.”).
6. Clifford Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN.
STUD. 1377, 1380 (2009) (discussing how increasingly dispersed ownership weakens shareholder
rights and exacerbates problems such as shareholder passivity).
7. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4 (1932); see also FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 2096.30 (discussing the separation of ownership and control as a foundational theory in corporate law).
8. Scholars disagree, however, about how to best achieve this end. Theories run the gamut from
trying to empower shareholders’ voices in corporate governance to limiting restrictions on management’s right to control the corporation.
Measures that focus on enhancing and enforcing the rights of shareholders fall into the shareholder primacy camp:
Shareholder primacy theory includes two bedrock principles: (1) maximizing long-term
shareholder value is the only legitimate objective of the corporation, and (2) designing
ways to assist shareholders in exerting control through their powers, including the power
to vote at annual meetings, will minimize the agency costs that result from the separation
of ownership from control in publicly traded and diffusely held corporations. It is a direct
outgrowth of agency theory.
J. W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J.
ON REG. 283, 318 (2010). See generally Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 850; Jonathan M. Karpoff et al.,
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agency paradigm, however, relies on a traditional image of a shareholder—a shareholder that is a direct (although likely very small) owner in an
individual company.9 In other words, the agency paradigm conceptualizes “shareholder” to mean an individual investor who buys stock in a
publicly traded company, like IBM, one of the case study companies discussed in this Article.10
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366
(1996) (“A central tenet of shareholder activism holds that shareholder proposals ameliorate the
shareholder–manager agency conflict and pressure managers to adopt value-increasing policies.”).
Under a director primacy theory, the board of directors is in the best position to monitor the company because of its interest in protecting and preserving their jobs and therefore the company as a
whole. In light of director incentives to efficiently monitor the company and maximize profits, under
a director primacy theory, directors should have greater control over the corporation with little
shareholder interference in the form of votes, disclosures, etc. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006); Verret,
supra, at 321–22. For a description of a nexus-of-contracts theory organization view of the firm,
which serves, in part, the director primacy theory, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 775–84 (2006) (describing the corporation as “a legal fiction representing the nexus of a set of contracts among the multiple factors of
production provided by the organization’s various constituencies,” which minimizes the role of
shareholder ownership).
These two ends of the spectrum can be generally summed up as the shareholder primacy and director primacy camps, with an understanding that there are many alternative and competitive theories that fall in between (and on other axes within the same debate). Id. (describing shareholder
primacy and director primacy theories along with contractarian theory, agency law theory, progressive corporate law, and a team production theory of corporate law); see also Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–53 (1999);
Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder–Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59 (2010).
9. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 5, at 1444–45 (“According to the principal–agent model, corporations are the ‘property’ of shareholders, who are the ‘principals’ who hire directors and officers to
act as ‘agents’ on their behalf. An important implication of the principal−agent model is that shareholders are, or ought to be, the sole residual claimants in corporations, entitled to each and every
penny of profit left over after the firm’s contractual obligations have been met.”).
The small, direct owner in a corporation is often referred to as a “retail investor.” See generally
Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?,
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 125 (2012) (discussing the difficulty of small “retail” investors in
arbitrating claims); Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105
(2009) (discussing the role of the retail investor); Jeffrey Ross, A Brief Overview of the U.S. DOL’s
Proposed Re-Definition of Investment Advice, in RECENT CHANGES IN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Melissa Silvanic ed., 2012), 2012 WL 698041, at *6 (discussing the
impact of the proposed changes on “retail investors”).
10. In this Article, I discuss three case study companies: Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint. Using
publicly available information, I ranked the corporations by revenue and created a combined ranking
of global economies (country by GDP and corporation by gross revenue). See infra Table 7: Top
Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Companies by Revenue in 2010. To highlight the
argument advanced in this Article and the issues raised in Part III, I gathered additional data regarding the top (Wal-Mart), middle (IBM), and lowest (WellPoint) U.S.-based and publicly traded companies included in the top 100 list. See infra Part III. In addition, I aggregated data for the top eleven
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Currently, indirect owners like mutual fund investors are not directly included in the agency paradigm’s conceptualization of shareholders.
For example, a Wal-Mart employee invests in a BlackRock mutual fund
as a part of a 401(k).11 The BlackRock mutual fund is invested in IBM
and is therefore the shareholder in the company (and the agency paradigm), not the employee−investor—even though she bears the ultimate
risk of ownership. Mutual fund ownership thus augments the distance
between the “owners” and the management, and complicates the application of the agency paradigm to questions of modern investment.12 Consequently, the agency paradigm should be modernized to incorporate the
unique identity and interests of these investors, a class of investors
termed herein as the citizen shareholders.
A. Forces of Change
With 90 million U.S. citizens invested in mutual funds,13 the traditional concept of the individual, direct shareholder is divorced from economic realities for the majority of investors.14 Investment trends, and the
conditions that will likely perpetuate them, are changing who is investing, in what, and why.15 The most dominant of these trends is retirement
mutual funds and describe in further detail their role in defined contribution plans and the arguments
relating to the interconnectedness of investments. See infra Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with
200,000 Shares or More in Case Study Companies (2010); Table 9 Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and
Government Institutional Investors in Case Study Companies. Data tables not included in the main
body of the Article are provided in an Appendix at the end.
11. To illustrate the distinction between direct and mutual fund shareholders, as well as other
terms relied on in this Article, consider the following example. Wal-Mart offers its securities (shares
or stock) for sale on a publicly traded exchange (e.g., NYSE or NASDAQ). An individual, direct
shareholder owns shares in Wal-Mart. A mutual fund investor, by contrast, owns shares in a mutual
fund, say for example BlackRock. The mutual fund is the entity that owns stock in Wal-Mart, what I
refer to as the “underlying” company throughout this Article.
12. See, e.g., PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY, A
POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 143–44 (2008) (“Owners of shares, represented
by intermediary financial institutions and corporations, operate at a great distance from each other,
incomparable with the situation that prevailed for most of the twentieth century.”).
13. INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 80 (51st ed. 2011) www.ici.org/
pdf/2011_factbook.pdf [hereinafter ICI 2011 FACTBOOK]. Mutual fund ownership is over 40% of the
population of this country, compare with the 6% of the country’s population invested in mutual
funds in 1980. Id. at 79.
14. For those who subscribe to a shareholder-centric vision of corporate governance, focusing just on direct shareholders ignores how much capitalism’s environment has
changed . . . . While working people through their savings today hold the majority of
stock in the most powerful enterprises in the world, they are not even mere legal owners
anymore.
Taub, supra note 5, at 847.
15. The data indicate that primarily middle-class citizens are investing in the stock markets,
primarily through mutual funds:
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investment through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans like
the 401(k).16 This trend has created a class of investors who have limited
choice about entering the market and whose retirement savings bear the
risk of the markets without the traditional rights associated with such
ownership. These three facts—mutual funds, employer-sponsored plans,
and retirement saving—fundamentally alter the landscape of individual
investments. Part II discusses in detail investment trends and their affect
on the agency paradigm; a summary of those main arguments is provided
below.
First, for a growing group of investors, participation in the stock
market can no longer be thought of as a voluntary endeavor for those
with discretionary or extra funds.17 Rather, it has become a default form
of retirement savings, a personally important task that is crucial to individual and social financial stability.18 While investors do have choice

The majority of U.S. households owning mutual funds had moderate incomes. Onequarter of mutual fund-owning households had household incomes of less than $50,000;
20 percent had household incomes between $50,000 and $74,999; 19 percent had incomes between $75,000 and $99,999; and the remaining 36 percent had incomes of
$100,000 or more. The median household income of mutual fund-owning households
was $80,000.
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 82.
16. Taub, supra note 5, at 847, 851 (describing institutional investors as representing state and
union pension funds along with mutual funds, but noting the investment in mutual funds through
employer-sponsored retirement “channels” was the predominant form of investment). The Investment Company Institute defines a defined contribution plan as “[a]n employer-sponsored retirement
plan, such as a 401(k) plan or a 403(b) plan, in which contributions are made to individual participant accounts. Depending on the type of DC plan, contributions may be made by the employee, the
employer, or both.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 216. For the purposes of this Article,
401(k) plans will be the focus of the collected data and therefore the subject of greatest discussion
herein. The assertions made in this Article, however, include all defined contribution plans.
17. The experience of most readers probably parallels those of the “majority of investors” described herein. An employee is automatically enrolled in a 401(k) plan upon hiring, selects a few
funds from fifteen to twenty-five participating funds (see, for example, infra Part III) in which to
invest and keeps his or her investments in the employer’s plan, while perhaps making allocation
adjustments to reflect changing retirement goals or the performance of a particular fund. Such an
investor had little choice in making the initial investment and little choice regarding the funds into
which he or she will invest (as compared with the option to invest directly in any publicly traded
company, which is the assumption in the traditional agency paradigm).
For a discussion of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, see Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market
Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 481 (2001); see also Paul Schott Stevens,
President & CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., Speech at the Ayco Summer InnerCircle Benefits and Compensation Conference: How the 401(k) System Is Succeeding (July 28, 2011) [hereinafter Stevens, ICI
Speech], available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/speeches/11_pss_ayco_401k.
18. “Mutual funds play a key role in achieving both the long- and short-term savings goals of
U.S. households. In 2010, 74 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated that their primary
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with regard to investment options within a plan and can even opt out of
participating in defined contribution plans altogether, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that a majority of investors are reluctant and
feel ill-equipped to use those options.19 Such an investor has little choice
in making the initial investment and little choice regarding the funds into
which she will invest, particularly when compared to the option to invest
directly in any publicly traded company, which is the assumption in the
traditional agency paradigm. Investing through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans alters the investor’s choice to enter the market,
as well as the investor’s choice to exit the market, which will be limited
by the available investment alternatives within the employer’s plan.20
Exit rights,21 like voting, are important arrows in investors’ quiver as the
rights to withdraw money and leave facilitate investors’ influence of corporate managers through the threat of falling share prices.22
Second, the number of investors in this class is at a tipping point,
outpacing the growth in any other category of investment and likely to
financial goal for their fund investments was saving for retirement.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note
13, at 84.
19. “[W]hile the employee makes the selection at the fund level, the employer (i.e., corporate
management) makes the fund family selection. Corporate management who, acting as plan sponsor,
influences which fund families will be among the investment choices.” Taub, supra note 5, at 876.
Study after study shows that Americans possess little financial acumen, both generally
and when it comes to investing. Moreover, with respect to 401(k) investors, there is particular reason for concern. In a recent survey, about 50% rated themselves as “not very
experienced” or “not at all experienced” in investing. Perhaps this is because 401(k) participants do not relish the opportunity to invest. The same survey labeled 62% of 401(k)
participants as “accidental investors,” because they “typically invest only [in their
401(k)s], they don’t enjoy investing, and they don’t pay much attention to what they invest in.
Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 55 (2012) (citing ALLIANCE
BERNSTEIN, INSIDE THE MINDS OF PLAN PARTICIPANTS 5 (2009)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1393 (2011) (noting that after automatic enrollment, 401(k) participation increased even though opting out of it was easy).
20. See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88 (2010) (“Mutual funds differ
from ordinary companies in all three categories of shareholder rights, but they are most unusual in
terms of exit.”).
21. For example, the issue of compelled speech for dissenting shareholders was rejected as a
concern under the majority holding of Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), because an
unsatisfied shareholder could remedy the problem by selling her shares and reinvesting elsewhere.
“If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending general treasury money on
objectionable electioneering, they can divest.” Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against the
majority’s rationale that the secondary market for securities protects shareholders from the threat of
compelled political speech through corporate political independent expenditures).
22. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 711, 755 (2005) (describing how shareholder exit after the lock-up period with stock offered in
an initial public offering can cause a drop in stock price).
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soon include most working Americans.23 Yet, this group has no direct
role in the agency paradigm.24 Consider again, for example, the WalMart employee with 401(k) investments in BlackRock mutual funds.
BlackRock, not the employee−investor, votes in IBM director elections
and exercises other shareholder rights. While the mutual fund investor is
represented by the BlackRock fund managers, there are legitimate criticisms of managers’ ability to represent the interests of individual mutual
fund investors.25
Third, what the average American investor “owns” through their
securities holdings26 is very different from what a controlling-interest or
blockholding shareholder27 in an individual company owns.28 For exam23. See infra Part II.B. “The U.S. mutual fund market—with $11.8 trillion in assets under
management at year-end 2010—remained the largest in the world, accounting for 48 percent of the
$24.7 trillion in mutual fund assets worldwide.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 22.
24. For a discussion of mutual fund investments and the voting and disclosure rules to which
they are subject, see Mary Joan Hoene et al., Practising Law Inst. CLE, Background: Mutual Funds
and Exchange-Traded Funds 2011 (June 9, 2011).
25. The efficacy of mutual fund managers to represent mutual fund investors’ interests is a
subject of continued study and debate. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 844–45; see also William A.
Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry,
80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (“This Article argues that the industry’s faults can be found in
the idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the ability of managers to
wield substantial power and to use that power to extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from
shareholders.”). For a more detailed discussion of the criticisms regarding mutual fund management
representation of investors’ interests, see infra notes 119–25.
26. See, e.g., GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 12, at 144 (“This [separation of ownership from
control] is a second important element in the transformation of the nature of the ownership of the
public corporation: for many funds, attachment to a particular corporation as an owner is no longer
the primary motivation for holding shares. Today’s shareholder can be an investor who diversifies
his/her portfolio sufficiently to minimize risk and cares little about the raison d’être or fate of any
individual corporation; he/she is primarily interested not even in a corporation’s profits, but in a rise
in its share price to improve the performance of the investment portfolio.”).
27. A blockholder is an individual shareholder, trust, or the composite shares held by a single
family that has a large ownership interest in a public company. See generally Holderness, supra note
6. “[M]inority control, may be said to exist when an individual or small group hold a sufficient stock
interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation through their stock interest. Such a group is
often said to have ‘working control’ of the company.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 80.
As the size of the corporation increases along with the dispersion of stock ownership, there is a
decrease in the size of the controlling interest sufficient to influence the company. Id.; see also
Sanjai Bhagat et al., Relational Investing and Firm Performance, 27 J. FIN. RES. 1, 9 (2004) (defining blockholding shareholders and documenting their stake in U.S. companies from 1987 to 1990);
Holderness, supra note 6 (discussing the presence of blockholding shareholders in U.S. public companies and concluding that ownership in the U.S. is less dispersed than assumed).
28. Another fault line separating shareholders is the extent to which their portfolios are
diversified. James Hawley and Andrew Williams have advanced the argument that the institutionalization of U.S. shareholdings created a new category of shareholders, “universal owners,” who are characterized by their holdings across a wide spectrum of the stock
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ple, the Wal-Mart employee’s retirement account that is invested in
BlackRock mutual funds benefits from sustained market stability and
performance, rather than firm-specific returns like IBM’s daily stock
price. Even though studies indicate that investors may not care about
market performance as a whole, they benefit from it.29
The changing investment landscape alters key assumptions of the
agency paradigm and supports supplementing the shareholder definition
with the citizen shareholder identity.
Part III introduces a separate but related argument for why the
shareholder identity should be expanded to include the “citizen shareholder” and acknowledges growing corporate spaces as another force
contributing to the new economic reality of investments. By corporate
spaces, I mean both the size of corporations and the public functions they
perform in modern society. As to the first, both the growth of corporate
revenues—influenced in part by the influx of capital from the growing
number of investors30—and the concentration of wealth in corporations31
demonstrate increasing size. Additionally, there is a level of interconnectedness of investments. For example, BlackRock, a Wal-Mart 401(k)
plan participant, is invested in Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint. And those
companies and their mutual-fund participants are also invested in the
case study companies.32 The trend of concentration of wealth is also mirrored by mutual funds so that the largest mutual funds control an increas-

market. Because their investment portfolios are so diversified, universal owners are
thought of as “owning the economy.” . . . Universal owners can be contrasted with undiversified shareholders, such as inside shareholders and founding-family shareholders,
who have their wealth disproportionately invested in a given company.
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–
84 (2006) (citing JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM
21 (2000)).
29. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28; Stout, supra note 5.
30. See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1427–28 (2002) (describing the “influx of individual investors into the
capital markets”); see also Floyd Norris, As Corporate Profits Rise, Workers’ Income Declines, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/business/workerswages-chasing-corporate-profits-off-the-charts.html (discussing the record profits of corporations as
rising to 14% of the national GDP).
31. For example, looking at 2010 data, the top 5% of companies whose primary listing is on an
American stock exchange accounted for “70% ($10.6 trillion) of the market value and 90% ($765
billion) of the total profit . . . .” They Are the 5%, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.econo
mist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/11/corporate-wealth.
32. See infra Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in
Case Study Companies; see also Figure 2: Interconnectedness between Mutual Funds, Corporate
401(k) Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan.
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ingly large market share of managed assets.33 The level of investment
interconnectedness between the top public companies and mutual funds,
which provide the securities invested in by a majority of Americans, further supports supplementing the traditional image of the individual, direct shareholder with the citizen shareholder, whose interests lie with
market performance.
The scope of corporations also references the public functions performed by corporations. Examples of public functions include providing
health care insurance, providing vehicles for individual retirement savings, and participating in political speech.34 Private entities providing
increasingly public functions affect the interests of investors and noninvestors alike, further demonstrating the need for a shareholder image
that accurately captures the relationship between economic, social, and
political interests implicated by market performance and stability. The
phrase citizen shareholder is intended to capture, in part, the juxtaposition of private entities performing public functions and the increasing
link between corporate performance and social stability. As economic
interests become inextricably intertwined with the social and political,
the agency paradigm requires language that reflects the bifurcated interests of investors as shareholders and citizens alike.35
B. The Citizen Shareholder
Expanding the shareholder identity in the agency paradigm to include citizen shareholders36 better captures the entire scope of interests
implicated by modern investment practices, and is discussed in detail in
Part IV. In previous articles, I introduced the phrase citizen shareholder
33. In this past decade, however, the percentage of industry assets at larger fund complexes has increased. The share of assets managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 74
percent in 2010 from 68 percent in 2000. In addition, the share of assets managed by the
largest 10 firms in 2010 was 53 percent, up from the 44 percent share managed by the
largest 10 firms in 2000.
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23.
34. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The
Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 852 (2010).
35. Many [scholars] have concluded that the principal–agent model fails in important
ways to capture the economic and legal realities of public corporations. Many also have
begun to suspect that, quite apart from doubts about the market’s efficiency, the idea that
directors best serve shareholders by ruthlessly maximizing share price rests on a narrow,
unrealistic, and impoverished view of what is truly in “shareholders’ interests.”
Stout, supra note 5, at 1445.
36. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 577 (describing the different “flavors” of shareholders and
their myriad of interests in investments).
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to describe the connection between economic and political interests when
corporations engage in political speech. I use it in this Article for similar
as well as newly expanded reasons. Citizen shareholder is meant to capture the growing group of investors who enter the market through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans by investing in mutual
funds, whose choices are structurally constrained, and who bear the risks
of the market without the benefit of ownership rights extended to traditional shareholders. Identifying this group as “citizen” shareholders
speaks to the commonality of these investors in how and why they enter
the market. It also speaks to the interconnection between market performance and individual financial security, as well as to the fusing of economic interests with social and political interests.37 Finally, it speaks to
the ubiquity of both corporations in society and individual investment in
them. By giving name to this class of investors, it is my intention to focus corporate law debates on these investors’ interests, as well as
acknowledge the personally and socially vital role that their investments
serve.
Citizen shareholder is a metaphor—a language device—used to
both conceptualize and convey the facts that a majority of Americans are
corporate shareholders, that the 90 million Americans who are indirect
investors benefit from market performance as a whole, and that corporate
spaces are growing so that the links between the economic and the social,
the public and the private, and the corporation and the individual are ever
increasing. Corporate law analysis under the traditional agency paradigm
is outdated because of the current, limited definition of shareholder. It
must be expanded if the paradigm is to remain relevant to modern investment practices. Unless the agency paradigm is expanded to include
the citizen shareholder identity, a growing majority of modern investors
37. In this Article, I discuss the interrelationship between corporate action and the affect on
social and political interests. This assertion is observational and is not to suggest that individual
investors are aware of or presently care about the consequences of this interrelationship. For example, the current debate about corporate political spending highlights how economic and social/political interests are intertwined. The debate cannot be cast as solely a corporate, economic, or
political one. Rather, the debate involves all of these interests. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (discussing the distinction between ordinary business decisions and corporate political speech/spending
decisions and examining legislative options in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Citizens United); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 102–03 (2008) (discussing the
origins and evolutions of Berle’s view of the role of corporations in light of changes in the economy,
politics, and policies); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform Public Functions:
Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (2000) (identifying ways in which the public/private dichotomy falls away, for example, when private corporations “contract with governments to manage prisons and public schools, or distribute welfare benefits”).
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are left without a meaningful voice in an increasingly important sphere
of society.
II. A DYING PARADIGM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE
CITIZEN SHAREHOLDER
A. Declining Dominance: The Shelf-Life of the Traditional
Shareholder Identity
Traditional corporate law literature, beginning with Berle and
Means, discusses the problem of the modern corporation as the distance
between managers and stockholders, or the separation of ownership from
control.38 With one phrase, Berle and Means captured the agency problems of diverse and dispersed ownership with a powerful image. The
separation of ownership and control, the issue at the heart of most corporate law debates and developments in reporting and regulation,39 speaks
to the inherent agency problem40 that arises when those who govern the
company are not the owners. Therefore, laws and governance standards
seek to identify ways to properly align the interests of the managers
(those in control) with those of the shareholders (the owners).41
38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 4 (describing the public corporation as “a corporation in
which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of owners”); see also id. at 90–118 (identifying the forms of control within a corporation and
discussing the evolution of control being held by the owners to one dominated by management control).
39. “Corporations address passive owners’ vulnerability to mismanagement through such devises as monitoring of management by independent directors, shareholder voting backed by federal
proxy and disclosure rules, fiduciary duties, and takeovers. These devices not only cannot make
managers perfectly loyal to owners’ interests, but also could generate their own costs.” LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 193 (2009); see also id. at 195–207 (discussing different features of corporate governance and its shortcomings).
40. In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the interests of management
do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, and management thus cannot be automatically counted on to take actions that would serve shareholder interests. As a result, agency costs that reduce shareholder value might arise. Without adequate constraints and incentives, management might divert resources through excessive pay, self-dealing, or other means; reject beneficial acquisition offers to maintain its independence and private
benefits of control; over-invest and engage in empire-building; and so forth. Adequate
governance arrangements, however, can provide constraints and incentives that reduce
deviations from shareholder-value maximization.
Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 850; see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 193 (“The modern corporation,
however, is far from ideal. A key problem lies in how the corporate form deals with the agency costs
of delegating control to powerful managers.”).
41. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 6 (“The separation of ownership from control produces a
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and
where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear.”). Where the
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Corporate law allocates voting rights on certain issues to shareholders, as well as rights to receive information and inspect books and records.42 Together, these rights are referred to as “corporate democracy,”
reflecting the representative position that management holds with shareholders. Corporate democracy and the remedy of selling shares when
dissatisfied with corporate performance or policy are the primary rights
assigned to shareholders. The balancing point reflected by these rights
and the specific mechanisms developed under each were constructed
with the traditional image of a direct shareholder in mind, pitting shareholder interests against management authority.43
Berle and Means discussed the relationship between the size of corporations and the diverse and dispersed ownership of public companies
as eroding the foundational assumptions protecting shareholder rights,
and raised the red flag of accountability that continues to perplex scholars and lawmakers alike.44 The agency paradigm, which continues to
serve as a foundation of corporate law, was already weakened in 1932
when realities of investment were beginning to outgrow the concept of
the traditional shareholder.45
An identifiable shareholder with discrete and discernible interests in
a specific company is no longer the model that fits the majority of American investors.46 While there are blockholders47 in public corporations
interests of shareholders significantly diverge from those of the directors and officers of a corporation, “corporate law rules impose special requirements designed to address this conflict.” Bebchuk &
Jackson, supra note 37, at 90. Executive compensation regulations “say on pay” is an example of
how corporate rules seek to align management and shareholder interests. Id.
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211 (shareholder voting rights), 220 (shareholder access and inspection rights) (2011).
43. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870–77 (discussing shareholder voting rights developments intended to
empower the shareholder to serve as a meaningful check on the authority of corporate managers);
see also Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 885 (2010) (“The scope of shareholder voting power has also increased.”).
44. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 80. “The fundamental problem with diffuse ownership is
that a joint owner will not have the same incentives as either a manager or a monitor as a sole owner
will have. The more fractured the ownership becomes, the greater this free-rider problem becomes.”
Holderness, supra note 6, at 1379.
45. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 43, at 879–80 (describing the rising presence of institutional
investors and tracking their development, beginning in the 1920s).
46. See Stout, supra note 5, at 1445–47 (rejecting the traditional “principal–agent model [that]
assumes that shareholders in public corporations are a single, homogenous mass with a uniform
interest in raising share price,” and arguing for a view of investors as highly diversified and whose
interests may include factors outside of economic returns); see also Anabtawi, supra note 28, at
578–93 (arguing that there are five main distinctions among shareholders that make it impossible for
the law to characterize shareholders as having discernible and harmonized interests); William B.
Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1999) (describing investors as having different “flavors”).
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and a small number of investors own a large percentage of securities,48
this is not the reality for the over 90 million Americans invested in the
stock market through mutual funds.49
The identity of the individual shareholder is ill-equipped to represent the interests or to protect the rights of modern investors.50 To reach
their conclusions, Berle and Means compiled data on corporate ownership and control, and drew larger conclusions about the then-current
function and conceptualization of corporations.51 Infusing the agency
paradigm with external economic realities— where a majority of Americans are invested in securities and where corporations play expanding
roles in modern society—requires adopting a shareholder identity, like
that of the citizen shareholder, capable of reflecting these new realities.
B. Recognizing a New Reality: The Evolution of American Investment
Given the number of American households52 invested in the stock
market, the economic rights53 of citizens are intimately tied to how cor47. Holderness, supra note 6, at 1377 (“This article offers evidence on the ownership concentration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have
blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock.”); see also
Bhagat et al., supra note 27, at 9 (identifying the number of outside investors holding 10% or more
of the company’s securities during the study period of 1987−1990).
48. For example, the top 10% of U.S. households (measured by income) owned 50.8% of the
stocks held by households, and the next 10% (of ranked households) owned 29.3% of equity assets.
FED. RESERVE SYS., SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES (2009), available at http://federalreserve
.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2009p.htm; see also Share of Stock Holdings Held by Top 10% Has Barely
Budged in Last Two Decades, ECON. POLICY INST., (2011), http://stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/
distribution-of-stock-market-wealth-by-wealth-class-1962-2007/ (measuring investment asset concentration among U.S. households from 1962 to 2007). 2007 data collected by the Federal Reserve
that separates out ownership of stocks from mutual funds suggest that there is significant concentration of wealth among consumer mutual fund investors as well. The top 1% of mutual fund owners
held 46.7% of mutual fund assets, and the 90–99 percentile controlled another 40% of mutual fund
assets. Families in the top 50–90 wealth percentile owned 11.6% of mutual fund assets. ARTHUR B.
KENNICKELL, PONDS AND STREAMS: WEALTH AND INCOME IN THE U.S., 1989 TO 2007, FED.
RESERVE BD., FIN. AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS &
MONETARY AFFAIRS, PAPER 2009-13, 63 fig.A3a: Amounts and shares of net worth and components; by net worth percentile group; 2007 SCF, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/
feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf.
49. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80.
50. For a brief discussion of the limitations of mutual fund managers as a sufficient representation of mutual fund investors’, or citizen shareholders’, interests, see supra note 25.
51. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 121 (describing the challenges to internal governance of a corporation where there are “owners without appreciable control and the control without appreciable ownership . . . ”).
52. The empirical research regarding investments is often focused at the household, rather than
the individual, level. Investment assets are often subject to joint ownership interests for assets ac-
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porations operate and the standards by which they are governed. Estimates range from just under 50%54 to over 54% of American households
are invested in the stock market.55 Not only has the number of Americans
invested in the stock market changed the nature of stock investment but
the circumstances under which most Americans invest have also contributed to the change.56 For example, stock ownership is increasingly indirect, typically in mutual funds through an employer-sponsored plan or
investment company, rather than purchasing shares of stock held directly
in one company.57 Additionally, the reasons for investing have evolved
from a voluntary, discretionary asset allocation for wealthier households

quired during a marriage and are often intended for the support of the entire household rather than
the individual holder. The focus on the household rather than the individual is consistent with financial and economic research. See, e.g., Jane Wheelock & Elizabeth Oughton, The Household as a
Focus for Research, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 143 (1996) (discussing the merits of household level research on issues related to consumption and labor supply).
53. See infra Part III for a discussion of other investor interests, such as social and political
interests, implicated by corporate action.
54. In 1989, when equity ownership in America was first calculated, 32% of American households owned stocks or bonds. INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, EQUITY AND
BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2008 9 (2008), available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners
.pdf [hereinafter ICI & SIFMA]. As of the first quarter of 2008, 45% of households in America (approximately 54.5 million citizens) own stocks or bonds, falling from a peak of 53% in 2001. Id.
There are four primary means by which individuals may own stock. Thirty-four million
directly own shares in publicly traded companies. Twenty-seven million own shares in
equity mutual funds outside of retirement saving plans and pension accounts; some of
these individuals also own stock directly. Nearly 34 million own equity through selfdirected retirement plans such as Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans or 401(k)
plans, and 48 million own equity through defined contribution pension plans. There is
substantial overlap among these four methods of share ownership. When this overlap is
accounted for, a total of 84 million shareowners hold stock through at least one of these
channels, and three million hold stock through all four channels.
J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2.30 (2011). Fortythree percent hold bond-based mutual funds and 45% hold hybrid mutual funds. Press Release, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Nearly Half of U.S. Households Owns Equities,
Bonds (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=9624.
55. Dennis Jacobe, In U.S., 54% Have Stock Market Investments, Lowest Since 1999, GALLUP
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147206/Stock-Market-Investments-Lowest-1999.aspx
(based on the responses of over 1000 adults to a telephone poll, stock ownership among American
households, either directly or indirectly, is 54%, the lowest percentage number since Gallup began
tracking equity ownership in 1999); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2012, tbl.1211, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/banking_finance_
insurance/stocks_and_bonds_equity_ownership.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (calculating the
percentage of American households invested in the stock market, either directly or indirectly, at
53.3% in 2007).
56. See ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23 (documenting and discussing investment
trends in 2010).
57. Id. at 83; Evans, supra note 9 (describing the decline in direct ownership and trend toward
investment through and with institutional investors like mutual funds).
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to a nearly compulsory endeavor for employees through employerprovided 401(k) plans as the predominant form of retirement saving.58
Mutual funds, rather than direct stock ownership, are the fastest
growing class of investments among individual investors.59 Recent data
suggest that American households are selling their direct stock and investing primarily in mutual funds.60 The trend of investment in mutual
funds as a part of retirement savings among individual investors is not
new, but the numbers paint a more precise picture than summation alone
in demonstrating the true scope of this trend. “In 2010, an estimated 90
million individual investors owned mutual funds and held 87 percent of
total mutual fund assets at year-end.”61 Total U.S. household investment
in the stock market is 54%,62 out of which 51.6 million households, or
44% of all U.S. households, own mutual funds.63
To better understand this investment trend and forecast, one must
examine how investors are entering the market. Among these mutual
fund owners, a vast majority use mutual fund investments for retirement

58. “Ownership inside tax-deferred accounts accounted for most of the increase in the 1989 to
2001 period and has since remained steady, which implies that most of the decline since 2001 occurred outside tax-deferred accounts. Tax-deferred accounts include employer-sponsored retirement
plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).” ICI & SIFMA, supra note 54, at 15; see also
Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of
Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 309, 352 (2010) (“At one time, a relatively small segment of the public invested in
publicly-traded securities. Now a significant proportion of the U.S. population owns publicly-traded
stocks, either directly or indirectly. A major trend in the investment world has been the remarkable
growth of stock ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans. Additionally, there has
been even more remarkable growth in mutual funds.”); Medill, supra note 17, at 481 (discussing
automatic enrollment as the new trend in 401(k) plan administration).
59. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 8–9, 80 (“As households have increased their reliance on funds, their demand for directly held stocks has been decreasing for most of the decade . . . .”).
60. Households are the largest group of investors in funds, and registered investment
companies managed 19 percent of households’ financial assets at year-end 2008 . . . . As
households have increased their reliance on funds, their demand for directly held stocks
and bonds has grown more slowly. For example, over the period 2004 to 2008, households purchased, on net, a total of $2.4 trillion in mutual funds (including through variable annuities), ETFs, and closed-end funds, while they sold $2.5 trillion of directly held
stock. Much of this shift by households toward funds has been through net purchases of
mutual funds.
INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE FACTBOOK 8 (49th ed. 2009), available at
http://www.icifactbook.org/2009/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf.
61. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80.
62. See supra note 55.
63. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80.
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savings.64 These investment trends will persist in light of the fact that
72% of first-time mutual fund purchases after 2005 were made inside
employer-sponsored plans,65 which is a 20% increase since 1990.66 Additionally, initial money invested in a mutual fund through employersponsored retirement plans tends to stay invested in a mutual fund, even
if the funds do not remain in the original employer-sponsored account.67
For example, after termination, the Wal-Mart employee can maintain her
shares in the original BlackRock funds, or she may “rollover”68 the investments into her new employer’s plan or open a self-directed Individual Retirement Account (IRA).69 Throughout these transitions, whether to
a private or to another employer-sponsored account, the investment typically remains within a mutual fund.

64. Id. at 85–86. “The most significant distribution channel for equity mutual funds is the retirement channel. Thanks to special tax treatment tremendous incentives have been created to encourage workers to invest their wages into mutual funds held by retirement plans.” Taub, supra note
5, at 851.
65. As 401(k) and other employer-sponsored DC retirement plans have become increasingly popular in the workplace, the fraction of households that make their first foray into
mutual fund investing inside their employer-sponsored retirement plans has increased.
Among those households that made their first mutual fund purchase in 2005 or later, 72
percent did so inside an employer-sponsored retirement plan . . . .
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 85.
66. “Among those households that made their first purchase before 1990, 52 percent did so
inside an employer-sponsored retirement plan.” Id.
67. “[Sixty-three] percent of mutual fund-owning households without funds in workplace accounts held funds in their IRAs and in many cases, these IRAs held assets rolled over from 401(k)s
or other employer-sponsored retirement plans (defined benefit or DC plans).” Id. at 86.
68. These DC Plans permit investors to transfer their DC Plan assets (but not DB Plan assets) into Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”). In addition to maintaining the tax relief and creditor shielding available in DC Plans, [retail customers] find IRAs attractive,
because IRAs provide greater investment options, often at less cost, than DC Plans. A recent study indicated that as a result of rollovers from DC Plans into IRAs (often due to
job changes or losses), investors had more assets in IRAs, which are not subject to
ERISA fiduciary standards, than they held in 401(k)s, which are subject to ERISA fiduciary standards.
David Groshoff, Responding to Dodd−Frank Section 913’s Punt: An Essay Calling for Bifurcated
Fiduciary Standards Among Retail Financial Advice Providers, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 151,
159 (2011) (emphasis added).
69. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 86.
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Table 1: American Investment by the Numbers
54% of American Households

Invest in the stock market

44% of American Households

Invest in mutual funds

68% of American Households
invested in mutual funds

Own mutual funds in employersponsored plans
First purchased securities through an
employer-sponsored fund if entering
the market in 2005 or later

72% of American Households

C. Recognizing a New Reality: The Emergence of the Citizen
Shareholder as the Dominant Shareholder Identity
Rising investments in mutual funds—a trend predicted long ago70—
and the declining dominance of individual investment in direct companies, coupled with the decline of private71 pensions,72 fundamentally alter
the shareholder identity and investment assumptions. The proliferation of
mutual fund ownership as facilitated by employer-sponsored defined
contribution retirement plans is likely to continue, especially in light of
developments such as automatic enrollment in employer-sponsored contribution plans. Automatic enrollment makes 401(k) plan participation
the default option for employees, which both encourages greater employ70. See, e.g., MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 14–18 (2d
ed. 2011).
71. Note that government-sponsored pension plans, particularly at the state and local level,
remain a meaningful mechanism for public-sector employees to save for retirement. See supra discussion Part II.B. The issues raised in this Article, in part, apply to public employees participating in
pensions because the pensions are invested in the market similar to mutual funds.
72. Id. at 283; cf. Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17. The term pension has broad meaning and
can include any form of employer-sponsored retirement program, including both defined benefit and
defined contribution plans. In this Article, I distinguish between defined contribution plans, which
include employee-directed accounts such as IRAs, 401(k)s, and 457s. The term pension is used
above to focus only on defined benefit plans. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, supra note 19, at 55 (“The
traditional private pension is the defined benefit plan. In these plans, employers promise to provide
their employees with a portion of their preretirement income in retirement. Such plans, however, are
on the decline and now cover only a small portion of the population.”); DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH,
HUDSON INST., UNION VS. PRIVATE PENSION PLANS: HOW SECURE ARE UNION MEMBERS’
RETIREMENT 6 (2008), available at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/UnionVsPrivatePen
sionPlans.pdf.
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ee participation in retirement savings and likens such private investment
to a form of employment tax.73 Given the current number of mutual fund
investors and the emergence of automatic enrollment, the number of citizen shareholders has achieved a critical mass that will continue to expand. The emerging dominance of the citizen shareholder requires measuring corporate success in terms that protect these investors’ interests.
One change resulting from the growth of mutual fund investment is
that mutual fund ownership is different in nature from direct stock ownership.74 A mutual fund investor is not an owner in the underlying company and thus is excluded from exercising shareholder rights or having
her interests represented in the agency paradigm.75 Mutual fund managers, not the investors, exercise direct shareholder rights such as voting,
and the limitations of this representation is discussed below in section D.
An investor entering through employer-sponsored defined contribution
plans like a 401(k) “takes the economic risk, but . . . she is not the legal
owner of the mutual fund or the underlying portfolio companies. In this
way . . . she is distanced even more from the location of control over the
capital . . . she has at risk.”76
73. I hope to explore these ideas and the comparisons in future works. My initial thoughts are
that tax incentives to invest, general investor information asymmetries, and automatic enrollment, as
well as other structural constraints, make participating in an employer-sponsored contribution plan
closer to the nature of an employment tax or a condition of employment. The consequences of encouraging participation are good: individual retirement savings. Savings benefit the individual investor as well as society by lessening the need for familial or governmental assistance after retirement. I
do not question the positive result of the program. But to the extent that individual investors are
pushed into private markets to serve, at least in part, a public function, the system into which the
individual invests should be subject to rigorous safeguards and scrutiny.
74. The voting rights are different, the reporting rights are different, and the exit remedies are
also significantly altered. Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89 (“Mutual funds differ from
ordinary companies in all three categories of shareholder rights, but they are most unusual in terms
of exit.”).
Corporations have an additional and significantly different set of problems: they are legally required to represent not a group of people but a legally defined set of interests—
the interests of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations, economic
incentives or political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular corporation.
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV.
995, 1033 (1998).
75. “Mutual funds are financial intermediaries through which investors pool their money for
collective investment, usually in marketable securities.” Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 580; see also
ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS 4 (1998).
76. Taub, supra note 5, at 851.
[Investors] “purchase” shares through their defined contribution (DC) plan that is sponsored by their employer. This is often referred to as the retirement channel. In the retirement channel, though, the retirement plan is the legal owner of fund shares. The employee is considered a “plan participant” and merely directs the plan to make investments of
his or her pre-tax wages in accordance with his or her instructions.

2012]

The Citizen Shareholder

1317

Investing in mutual funds not only alters the nature of what is
“owned” but also alters the level of risk exposure77 because of diversification.78 For example, when an investor buys one share of a mutual fund,
she holds an indirect interest in all of the stocks, bonds, or other securities invested in by the mutual fund in accordance with the mutual fund’s
investment objectives.79 Because one share represents an ownership interest in many securities, investors achieve a certain level of investment
diversification80 with just one investment decision. Diversification, in
theory, reduces a specific firm’s ability to affect the bottom line of the
investor’s retirement savings.81
Because a mutual fund owner is invested in “the market” or a representative sample of the whole,82 she may care more about overall growth
and stability of the market rather than the performance of a specific
firm.83 Additionally, she may incorporate a broader view of risk analysis
that takes into account stakeholder interests84 in addition to traditional
economic interests.85
Id.
77. A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with homogeneous preferences, would
in theory be able to specify a single objective for running the firm. Shareholders with private interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those interests at the expense of
the interests they have in common with other shareholders . . . . Thus, when shareholders
have divergent private interests, it is no longer accurate to think of shareholder action as a
collective good . . . . Put another way, how a shareholder would like the firm to be managed becomes a function of who the shareholder is and what its private interests are.
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 575.
78. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 564; Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 84 (2008); Stout, supra note 5, at 1448–49.
79. Taub, supra note 5, at 848–49.
80. “A universal shareholder is, in effect, a highly diversified investor. She invests . . . in the
equities of many different firms in many different industries.” Stout, supra note 5, at 1448; see also
Taub, supra note 5, at 852.
81. See, e.g., Diversifying Your Portfolio, INVESTORGUIDE.COM, http://www.investorguide
.com/igu-article-543-asset-allocation-diversifying-your-portfolio.html (describing the benefits of
individual portfolio diversification) (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
82. This occurs through investment vehicles like index funds. The ICI 2011 Factbook defines
index funds as “[a] fund designed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio of
securities is either a replicate or a representative sample of the designated market index.” ICI 2011
FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 218.
83. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 429 (1998) (asserting that diversified shareholders do not care about firm-specific risk or longevity).
84. “[A]ttention to traditional ‘stakeholder’ interests such as the effect of corporate operations
on the environment, employees, or local communities, is seen as a means of generating long-term
shareholder weather and improving portfolio- and firm-level risk assessment.” Ho, supra note 8, at
62 (defining the role of stakeholders in the enlightened shareholder value approach advanced in the
article); see also Taub, supra note 5, at 860 (“Included within a list of such stakeholders might be
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Differences in ownership between direct and indirect stockholders,
as well as the diversification of indirect stockholders, may affect an investor’s preference for corporate externalities86 as well as other factors
that influence portfolio analysis.87 Externalities are costs generated but
not borne by the corporation. While mutual fund investors should88 prefer market performance as a whole over firm-specific returns as a result
of diversification, they should also be concerned about corporate practices that generate externalities that affect other industries or the securities
market as a whole.89
Because questions of risk and return are not company-specific for
mutual fund investors,90 some academics have described these shareemployees, suppliers, customers, the local community, the environment, future generations, and
perhaps anyone impacted significantly by externalities resulting from corporate operations.”).
85. In other words, like many economic theories, the principal−agent model assumes investors only care about making money. Most people, and certainly most investors, do
want to acquire money. Extensive empirical evidence demonstrates, however (as does
casual observation) that money is not the only thing people care about. People often act
as if they care about other things as well, including their friends and loved ones; their
community; the environment; social justice, and the welfare of humanity.
Stout, supra note 5, at 1449.
86. See, e.g., Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in
a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 42 (1996)
(arguing that diversified shareholders do not want corporations to produce externalities in pursuit of
profit maximization, but instead want companies to pursue policies that are portfolio maximizing
thus minimizing externalities); see also Fairfax, supra note 78, at 84.
87. In the literature, this distinction is often referred to as the division between the diversified
and the undiversified shareholder. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85.
88. It simply doesn’t make economic sense for [universal owners] to put much time or effort into finding out what’s going on at any of the particular companies in which they
hold shares. Instead, they focus their attention on information that is simple, easy, and
cheap to obtain: stock price. As a result they usually don’t know when a company is externalizing costs onto their other interests . . . . They assume a rising share price must
translate into a personal benefit, ignorant of the damage being done to other parts of their
universal portfolio.
LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS
INVESTORS, CORPORATION, AND THE PUBLIC 89–90 (2012).
89. The extent of a shareholder’s diversification also matters with respect to how that
shareholder regards externalities, or spillover effects, that firms generate. One consequence of “owning the economy” is that, unlike less well-diversified investors, universal
owners can be expected to feel the impact of actions by one company in their portfolio on
their other portfolio companies. In other words, through its extensive holdings, the universal shareholder internalizes many of the externalities generated by the companies in
which it invests. Universal owners are thus likely to favor activities of firms in which
they own shares that minimize negative externalities (and maximize positive ones) to the
extent that those activities impose costs on (or can be captured by) other firms in which
they own an interest.
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 585.
90. This fact applies to all types of diversified investors, including mutual fund owners. See,
e.g., ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 216 (Diversification is “[t]he practice of investing

2012]

The Citizen Shareholder

1319

holders as “universal investors.”91 The phrase universal investor describes what an investor owns and her interest in the performance of the
market as a whole, as compared to an interest in a specific company.92
The theory of universal investors also describes the reduction in firmspecific risks achieved through portfolio diversification, as well as an
increased vulnerability to systemic risks or failures within the market.93
The economic realities of modern investment diminish the relevance of
the traditional shareholder identity. Understanding that market performance, rather than company-specific performance, has the greatest impact on the portfolio of a growing majority of investors underscores the
need to recast the agency paradigm with the universal interest of the citizen shareholder.94
Incorporating a “general” identity of the shareholder in the agency
paradigm lessens the need to find a way around shareholder heterogeneity,95 which is discussed in the corporate law literature. If (a) stock investment is a common practice, and for a majority of those investors,
they (b) invest in securities that advance a universal investor approach,
then focusing on investor-specific interests is incomplete. The current
economic reality of how a majority of individuals invest suggests that
while there are vast individual differences in investment performance
broadly across a number of different securities, industries, or asset classes to reduce risk. Diversification is a key benefit of investing in mutual funds and other investment companies that have diversified portfolios.”).
91. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note, at 28; see also Fairfax, supra note 78, at 83–85.
92. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note, at 28; see also Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85; cf.
Fairfax, supra note 78, at 84 n.170 (“[U]ndiversified shareholders tend to have large stakes in a
given company. This increases the likelihood that they are long-term investors. Hence, it is likely
that such shareholders care deeply about their own firm’s employees, customers, and creditors because their investment is linked with the well-being of these other stakeholder groups. In this regard,
it is probably more accurate to state that diversified shareholders are concerned about a broader
range of stakeholders.”).
93. The opposite is true for individuals invested directly in one company or who have a large
holding in a particular company so that their portfolio is disproportionately tied to the returns of one
company. In that instance, the externalization of risk is preferred to the internalization.
94. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85.
95. This section does not suggest that the different investor interests do not matter; instead,
what this section suggests is that for this class of investors—mutual fund investors who enter the
market through employer-sponsored retirement accounts—their economic interests can be generalized into a preference for market performance given the circumstances under which and purposes for
which they invest. For a discussion of the appropriate role of shareholder interest diversity in corporate governance, see generally STOUT, supra note 88 (providing examples of shareholder heterogeneity, including long-term versus short-term investors, direct investors versus mutual fund investors,
individual versus institutional investors, as well as interests in social and political consequences of
corporate action).
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and policy, those economic differences matter little to citizen shareholders when there is an undeniable common interest in the overall performance of the market.96 Even if market performance as a whole is not a
recognized interest for each individual investor, it is a valid measure or
substitute for mutual fund investors as a class within the agency paradigm. Replacing the focus on individual, direct shareholders with the
image of the citizen shareholder captures the vast mass of investors who
enter the market through employer-sponsored plans for individual retirement savings. Adopting a generalized shareholder standard, like that
of the citizen shareholder, diminishes the import of individual economic
differences as between investors and modernizes the agency paradigm by
holding corporate managers accountable to the interests of mutual fund
investors and, consequently, market stability and performance as a
whole.
A shift in thinking away from company-specific performance and
from investor-specific identities would discourage policies that generate
externalities such as excessive risk taking and unsustainable environmental, employee, and social policies.97 Recent examples of such risk taking
and externalities are evident in the failures of companies like Lehman
Brothers, the damage to financial institutions involved in the creation and
sale of collateralized debt instruments, and the resulting weakened housing market.98 Supplementing the agency paradigm with the citizen shareholder, and thus a focus on market performance, encourages marketstabilizing practices. Specifically, it reduces incentives for a company to
engage in practices that generate spillover effects or externalities that
have consequences outside of a specific firm and affect the market as a
whole.99

96. Corporate law should have different standards that account for different shareholder interests. I do not suggest otherwise; rather, I suggest that for mutual fund investors, the standard is market performance as a whole rather than firm-specific performance. There is also an implicit bias
toward long-term investment strategies when weighing the interests of this class of investors.
97. See, e.g., Hansen & Lott, supra note 86, at 44–46.
98. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives in the Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1009–10; see also Ho, supra note 8, at 89 (“The global economic crisis has also moved public opinion and public policy further in the direction of enlightened
shareholder value by calling attention to the dangers of short-term investment strategies and encouraging a reassessment of the balance between risk taking and risk management.”).
99. Universal investors have to worry about a problem that undiversified shareholders
don’t need to worry about—the possibility that, in the ruthless pursuit of a higher share
price, the board of directors of one company may adopt business strategies that have negative “spillover” effects on the universal investor’s other assets. Such negative spillover
effects are not only possible, but common, in today’s business world.
Stout, supra note 5, at 1448.
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The evolving nature of corporate investment—the widespread participation, the rise in indirect ownership, the limited choices offered in
the context of employer-sponsored plans—creates a new reality that must
be acknowledged and incorporated into the governance standards of corporate law. Supplementing the image of the single shareholder and its
corresponding idiosyncratic set of needs and interests100 with that of the
citizen shareholder infuses the agency paradigm with the tools to incorporate indirect owners’ interests—economic, social, political—
previously excluded from consideration and determine how they affect
overall market performance.
D. Dilution of Citizen Shareholder Rights Under the
Traditional Agency Paradigm
The evolving nature of corporate stock ownership by individuals
highlights the need to align corporate managers’ actions with investors’
interests. Corporate governance rules affect more citizens as stock ownership by American households has climbed above 50% and continues to
increase.101 Thus, the shareholder status is an important feature of the
citizen status. Occupying the majority status, stock ownership thus justifies the dedication of significant resources102 to ensure the health and
integrity of the system; there is great incentive to get it right and more at
stake if we do not. Consequently, the theoretical models relied on by
corporate law should evolve along with the circumstances under which
the greatest number of citizens invest.

100. A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with homogeneous preferences,
would in theory be able to specify a single objective for running the firm. Shareholders
with private interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those interests at the expense of the interests they have in common with other shareholders . . . . Thus, when
shareholders have divergent private interests, it is no longer accurate to think of shareholder action as a collective good . . . . Put another way, how a shareholder would like the
firm to be managed becomes a function of who the shareholder is and what its private interests are.
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 575.
101. See generally ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13; Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17.
102. By resources I mean thought, scholarly debate, public scrutiny, and possibly resulting
changes in legislation and subsequent enforcement through the legal system. What those specific
changes would be will be the subject of future works. My intent with this Article is to articulate the
tensions between the theory and the reality of modern investments, identify where the two are incongruent, and begin thinking about how to better infuse the theory with the economic reality of investments for a majority of investors.
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Traditional shareholder rights intended to alleviate the agency problem—usually focused on voting, disclosure, and exit rights103—are distorted in the context of indirect ownership facilitated through employersponsored funds. This distortion occurs because the mutual fund is an
intermediary104 that is inserted into the traditional paradigm to create
three actors: shareholders in the mutual fund, the mutual fund as the direct shareholder in the corporation,105 and management of the corporation. Inserting an intermediary increases the distance between the ultimate owners (the mutual fund investors) and those in control (corporate
management)106 and leaves indirect investors without a direct voice in
corporate governance or represented interests in the traditional agency
paradigm.107 That increased distance also weakens the accountability
mechanisms provided to shareholders under traditional corporate law so
that symptoms of modern corporate investment, such as rational shareholder passivity and diluted shareholder voice,108 are magnified with indirect ownership.109
Indirect ownership distorts traditional shareholder rights—voice
through vote, choice in investment, information rights, and exit remedies.
In regards to choice, when an individual invests in securities through an
employer-sponsored plan, the decision to invest is strongly encouraged
by tax incentives and, with features like automatic enrollment, is not a

103. “Since the publication of a widely read book by Albert Hirschman in 1970, social scientists have come to agree that all organizations give to their members and owners some combination
of the same three basic kinds of rights: exit, voice, and liability.” Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at
87.
104. “Mutual funds are financial intermediaries through which investors pool their money for
collective investment, usually in marketable securities.” Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 580; see also
POZEN, supra note 75, at 3.
105. A mutual fund that invests in stock is considered the shareholder in the underlying corporation; the mutual fund exercises corporate governance rights. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 848.
106. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 37, at 143 (“[Investment intermediaries] exacerbated
the separation of ownership and control, extending the distance between managers and the individuals who were the ultimate beneficial owners.”).
107. For a discussion on the limitations of mutual fund advisors to represent the interests of
those invested in the funds, see generally, Taub, supra note 5, at 852–55, 867–70, 892–93.
108. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible Investing: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 603 (2011) (discussing the commonplace of shareholder passivity and its role in both theoretical and practical debates).
109. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 523 (1990);
see also Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89; Michael C. Schouten, Why Governance Might
Work in Mutual Funds, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 86 (2011) (“Shareholder activism
in mutual funds nevertheless remains uncommon, which is widely attributed to collective action
problems. Because shareholders in mutual funds are typically household investors, their stakes are
said to be too small to make activism worthwhile.”).
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voluntary transaction in the traditional sense of the phrase.110 Second, the
employer determines the participating funds and offers a fixed list of investment options, not the full panoply of securities available on the market. Third, mutual fund products are the predominant asset class offered
in such plans.111 For example, IBM offers nineteen funds in its 401(k)
PLUS Plan.112 Of these nineteen funds, eleven are mutual funds (eight
U.S.-based equities and three foreign equity funds), four are bond funds,
two are real estate REITS, and one is a money market fund.113 These
structural conditions facilitate citizens investing in the market, most in
the form of mutual funds, and most entering the market through employer-sponsored funds.
The following example demonstrates the distorting affect of indirect ownership on traditional shareholder rights intended to strike the
appropriate power balance between shareholders and managers in the
agency paradigm. Investor A is a direct investor in IBM, and Investor B
is a mutual fund investor invested in BlackRock mutual funds through
her employer’s (Wal-Mart’s) plan. BlackRock mutual fund invests in
IBM, along with other funds. Annually, Investor A can vote to elect the
board of directors of IBM114 and recommend certain corporate policies
through the proxy process.115 Investor A receives proxy statements from
IBM before the annual director elections and votes on other matters of
110. The system is set up so that the default is to invest, and it takes positive action on behalf
of the employee to avoid that result. It is not voluntary in the traditional sense of the word because it
is not a transaction that was independently sought out by the individual and completed in the absence
of encouragement or inducement to do so. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 17, at 481 (noting that automatic enrollment plans were “a new and growing trend in the world of 401(k) plans”).
In 2010, Hewitt Associates reported that 58% of mid- to large-sized companies were using automatic enrollment 401(k) plans. Christine Dugas, Efforts to Raise 401(K) Participation Hit Snag,
USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/retirement/2010-01-10-401k-re
tirement-fix_N.htm.
The rise of the automatic enrollment 401(k) plans began in 1998 when the IRS “issued a series of
revenue rulings that encourage employers who sponsor 401(k) plans to enroll all eligible workers in
the plan, deduct a set percentage of employee compensation (typically one to three percent), and
contribute that amount to employee 401(k) plans.” Medill, supra note 17, at 515.
111. Mutual funds or index funds of U.S. and international securities make up a majority of
plan investment options and are supplemented by bond funds and low-interest earning money market
accounts. See, e.g., infra notes 143−44.
112. International Business Machines (IBM) 401k Plus Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplan
iq.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=675# (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
113. Id.
114. “To be sure, shareholders in the American public corporation have the right to vote on the
election of directors.” Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 837.
115. Id. at 846–47 (describing end-of-game decisions that the board can bring to the shareholder for an approval/veto vote).
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corporate significance such as proposed mergers.116 If Investor A becomes dissatisfied with the returns generated, concerned by the social
practices, or conflicted with the political positions of IBM, Investor A
may sell her shares on the secondary market through vehicles like ETrade or another broker and reinvest in another company of her
choice.117
Compare this to the rights of Investor B, who also has investments
in IBM through her mutual fund shares in BlackRock. Investor B has no
right to vote in IBM elections, although she may exercise voting rights in
the BlackRock mutual funds. Only BlackRock can vote in IBM elections.
Additionally, Investor B has no right to receive information directly from
IBM and thus has diluted information rights. Investor B also has significant barriers to removing her investment due to diluted information
rights. And her alternative investment options are constrained by the other funds included in Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan.118 These distinctions are
further discussed below.
For a majority of investors, their voting rights are limited to matters
affecting the intermediary mutual fund119 but not the final destination of
the investment, the individual company. This limit means that an individual invested in a mutual fund with 100 companies in the fund’s profile
would have money in the 100 individual companies but no voting rights
associated with that “investment.” Thus, the scope of the voting rights
for mutual fund investors is reduced along with the power of such votes.
In practice, mutual fund investors bear the risks of ownership without the
protection of rights typically associated with ownership.120 As demonstrated in the example above, Investor A can participate in the corporate
democracy of IBM, but Investor B cannot.121 These diminished rights
could be viewed as the cost of the convenience offered by mutual
116. See Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (1990);
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990); see also Black, supra note 109, at 536–41 (describing shareholder
notice and voting rules); MARK SARGENT & DENNIS HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK, § 2:12
(2011) (describing proxy voting rules).
117. See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 89.
118. See, e.g., infra notes 175–77 (describing the fund options within the 401(k) plans offered
by the three case study companies: Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint).
119. See, e.g., Daniel S. Alterbaum, To “Make Full Disclosure and Play No Tricks”: A Proposal to Enhance Fee Transparency After Jones v. Harris Associates, 120 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581–82
(discussing an investor’s right to vote on mutual fund matters as guaranteed through the Investment
Company Act of 1940).
120. Taub, supra note 5, at 851.
121. The mutual fund invested in IBM can, however, participate in IBM’s corporate democracy. Id. at 848. “The intermediaries who stand between investors and corporate managers have their
own interests, which are often at odds with the investors who trust them, and at times aligned with
corporate management.” Id. at 847.
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funds—the price paid to have a third party manage individual investment
portfolios.122
Mutual fund managers, and other institutional investors, represent indirect shareholders’ interests and should be good stewards because
they have better access to financial and company information,123 greater
incentive than retail investors to participate in corporate democracy,124
and a powerful “voice” in voting due to the size of their holdings.125 Mutual fund managers, however, have a history of passivity, routinely voting with management.126 Current trends suggest that mutual fund managers often delegate voting decisions to professional proxy voting services
like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),127 but the data are inconclusive as to whether or not mutual funds have truly embraced shareholder
activism.128
122. [F]or indirect shareholders who hold fund shares through a retirement plan, benefits
include the ability to invest a relatively small amount of money and yet have access to the
expertise of professional money managers. Individual shareholders also benefit from
achieving a diverse portfolio of securities that would otherwise be difficult to hold efficiently given the small amount of dollars invested.
Id. at 852; see also Booth, supra note 83, at 444 (“It is so cheap and easy for investors to diversify
that it is simply unnecessary for investors to take company-specific risk.”); Fisch, supra note 43, at
880 (“By investing their money through an intermediary, investors delegate to that intermediary
complete authority over investment decisions subject only to the specified terms of the investment
vehicle.”).
123. See, e.g., Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1785–
86 (2011) (“In any event, the vast majority of shareholder-voters are institutional investors. These
entities do not need shorthand to sort through information that may be expensive, or otherwise difficult, to procure. Rather, these institutions have the resource, the ability, and the duty to stay apprised
of the content of shareholder proposals.”).
124. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 323 (2011).
125. Id.; James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“Mutual funds represent the largest
shareholder voting bloc in U.S. corporate governance . . . .”).
126. Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1430–31 (summarizing the history of mutual fund voting prior
to 1970, as well as academic studies concluding that mutual funds are passive investors).
127. We find that mutual funds tend to vote in line with ISS recommendations across the
board. First, mutual funds vote consistently with ISS recommendations more often than
do all shareholders. Second, mutual funds vote consistently with ISS recommendations
more often than with management recommendations, both on non-routine management
proposals and shareholder proposals, and on specific types of anti-takeover and corporate
governance proposals.
Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 122, at 2.
128. Compare id., with JACKIE COOK & BETH YOUNG, THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, FUND
VOTING IN 2006: AN ANALYSIS OF 29 LARGE FUND FAMILIES’ VOTING RECORDS 2 (2007), available
at http://www.complianceweek.com/s/documents/Compliance%20Week%202007/Resource%20Mat
erials/Minow,%20Nell%20-%20The%20Corporate%20Library/FundVoting2006_ExecSumm.pdf. In
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While mutual fund investors are represented by mutual fund managers who vote on behalf of the fund and its investors, academics debate
the efficacy of such representation.129 The primary concerns regarding
mutual fund representation of investors’ interests include the following:
the conflict of interest between the mutual fund managers’ desire to align
interests with the fund sponsor (the employer or plan distributor) rather
than the fund participants (the employees);130 the interests of mutual fund
managers are inherently conflicted with those of their investors because
of how they are compensated and their performance evaluated;131 the
free-rider problem where mutual funds are asked to bear the costs of activism without securing the sole benefit;132 and both fund sponsors and
participants choose funds based on recent returns.133 When there are
an independent study conducted in 2006, the Corporate Library concluded that major mutual fund
families vote in favor of management resolutions over shareholder proposals. Id.
129. See supra note 25.
130. “[T]he [mutual fund] industry’s true customers are not individual investors, but rather
portfolio companies that can decide how to allocate their employee-thrift business.” Cotter, Palmiter
& Thomas, supra note 122, at 15.
131. Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1432; Taub, supra note 5, at 845, 867–75 (describing the conflicts of interests between mutual fund managers and investors).
[P]ersonal managerial motivations to some degree influenced by a firm’s culture explain
the desire to meet earnings targets. Managers may lose their jobs, fail to be promoted, or
find their opportunities to move to other firms impeded by their failure to meet earnings
targets. In addition, managers may suffer a decrease in compensation. To increase their
compensation, managers may seek short-term performance to enhance their bonuses
(based on accounting-earnings performance), stock compensation (based on stock-price
performance), or compensation based on the amount of assets under management that is
enhanced by short-term profits that draw additional assets to their funds.
Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L.
265, 272 (2012); see also ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009), available at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_ short_state0909_0.pdf
(discussing the concerns regarding the “influence of money managers, mutual funds and hedge
funds—and those intermediaries who provide them capital—who focus on short-term stock price
performance, and/or favor high-leverage and high-risk corporate strategies designed to produce high
short-term returns . . . .”).
132. Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the US, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 55 (Geoffrey Owen et
al. eds., 2006); see also Dallas, supra note 128, at 270 (asserting that “shareholders prefer short-term
results and focus on short-term information”).
133. Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: Inherently
and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 297 (“Studies have found that [historical high
returns] might be the most important factor for the typical investor choosing among funds.”); see
also Noel Capon et al., An Individual Level Analysis of the Mutual Fund Investment Decision, 10 J.
FIN. SERVS. RES. 59, 66 (1996); INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR
MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full
.pdf. Mutual fund managers have also been criticized for short-term investment horizons as evidenced by the turnover rates of mutual fund investments. See, e.g., CHRISTINE BENZ ET AL.,

2012]

The Citizen Shareholder

1327

compelling criticisms regarding the efficacy of mutual fund representation of indirect owners’ interests the citizen shareholder argument should
not be dismissed on the grounds that indirect owners’ interests are already represented in the agency paradigm.
Perhaps the most compelling view of a mutual fund investor’s diminished rights, however, is exit rights. While others have argued that
the fungible nature of mutual funds makes it an even more liquid asset
than investment in an individual company and therefore contains
strengthened exit rights, this view does not take into account the realities
of how a majority of investors enter and remain in the market.134 The
defined environment in which many Americans invest erodes the
strength of the popular remedy of voting with dollars or feet.135 The idea
behind exit remedies, or voting with your feet,136 is that dissatisfied
shareholders can express their disapproval by selling their investment on
the open market and investing elsewhere.
Investments through employer-sponsored plans thwart traditional
exit remedies in two respects. First, the increased distance between mutual fund investors and the companies held by the fund decreases shareholder involvement in and awareness of the underlying companies’ actions.137 As to the first concern, effective exit remedies require a minimum level of corporate and mutual fund information provided to the investor. A direct owner receives information straight from the company,
but a mutual fund investor has no such right to receive information from
the companies in which her fund invests. Returning to the original example, Investor B has no right to receive information directly from CompaMORNINGSTAR GUIDE TO MUTUAL FUNDS 11 (2004) (reporting a 114% average annual turnover in
stock mutual fund portfolios).
134. See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89 (asserting that investors in mutual
funds have greater exit rights as compared to direct investors because the assets remain with the
company being exited by direct investors, whereas a mutual fund’s assets are the investor’s cash, and
exit from a mutual fund removes the fund’s assets and therefore poses a greater threat).
135. The contained choice for investors among mutual funds participating in their employer’s
plan alters the exit remedy in that they may not have the option of an alternative mutual fund that
offers the same diversification and investment strategy, see infra note 142, or a fund that is also not
invested in the offending company.
136. Voting with feet is an expression used to describe the exit remedy of withdrawing shares
from one investment when dissatisfied and investing elsewhere. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 878
(“The most common defense given by passive institutional investors, including Advisers, for not
actively participating in corporate governance reform efforts is that they “vote with their feet” or sell
their shares if they do not like what management is doing.”).
137. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 32 (“Index funds continued to remain popular with
investors. Of households that owned mutual funds, 31 percent owned at least one index mutual fund
in 2010. As of year-end 2010, 365 index funds managed total net assets of $1 trillion.”).
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ny X whereas Investor A, as a direct owner, would.138 Investor B can
access other sources of information such as publicly available information on the internet and disclosures made by the mutual fund directly
to Investor B.139 Investor B, however, faces an onerous responsibility if
she is tasked with both monitoring and aggregating information about all
of the companies in which her fund invests. Additionally, the current policy and corporate law debate over reporting obligations and shareholder
voting rights for corporate political expenditures demonstrates that a base
level of reporting does not exist for direct or indirect shareholders with
respect to the full range of issues that may prompt exit by the investor.140
Second, there are structural constraints to exit for a mutual fund investor who must balance dissatisfaction with one fund company as compared to the performance of the other fund companies, as well as to alternative investment options before making an exit choice. Even if Investor
B through her information-gathering efforts became dissatisfied with a
particular company that is one of 100 within her fund, she must choose
between the risks and downsides of that one company as compared to the
benefits of the other ninety-nine. Additionally, just as employersponsored plans constrain an investor’s initial choice of funds,141 they
also restrict the investor’s ability to choose to exit by limiting the pool of
138. See supra notes 105−07 and accompanying text.
139. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (Reg. FD), SECURITIES EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm; 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249
(2000). “[E]lectronic media increases market efficiency by allowing dissemination of market information in a more cost efficient, widespread, and equitable manner than traditional paper based methods.” Jack A. Rosenbloom, Direct Public Offerings on the Internet: A Viable Means of Obtaining
Capital?, 2000 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 85, 93; see also Use of Electronic Media for Delivery
Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53458 (Oct. 13, 1995) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, 271); Disclosure
of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act
Release No. 25922, 2003 WL 215451, at *2 (Jan. 31, 2003); see also Taub, supra note 5, at 865–66
(discussing mutual fund proxy voting reporting requirements).
140. See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending and Shareholders’ Rights:
Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 391, 394 (Abol Jalilvand & A.G. Malliaris eds., 2011).
141. An employee participating in an employer-sponsored plan with automatic enrollment may
opt-out of the participating funds and self-manage. To do so, however, requires the investor to take
positive action and thereafter assume a much greater role in managing his or her retirement account.
Medill, supra note 17, at 481; see also Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17. The anecdotal evidence—which I suspect comports with the experience of the majority of readers—as well as the
research supports the conclusion that few employees choose to do so. Id. (“In Vanguard’s experience, auto-enrollment plans have participation rates of 82 percent of workers. That’s significantly
higher than similar plans with voluntary enrollment.”). The tax incentives for employees to contribute a portion of their earnings before tax is also inducement to participate. Id. This inducement
serves a positive social goal of encouraging retirement savings, but how and why investors enter the
market should be understood and taken into account when evaluating investors’ rights.
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alternative plans. If there are twenty funds participating in her employer’s plan, Investor B’s exit choice is influenced by the attractiveness (or
lack thereof) of the other nineteen options. Additionally, if the company,
like IBM, is a large company traded on a U.S. exchange, it may be difficult for Investor B to find a suitable alternative mutual fund offering a
similar risk and diversification portfolio142 that does not also invest in
IBM.143 Investor B may be structurally constrained from exercising even
her weakened exit rights under the terms of modern, indirect investment.
In sum, the predominant form of investment in this country, mutual
funds, distorts the traditional shareholder rights—voting, disclosures, and
exit. The identity of the shareholder in the agency paradigm is outdated
and relies on the image of the direct shareholder, which is not the economic reality for a majority of investors. As a result, the agency paradigm excludes the interests of indirect investors from its inquiry into
shareholder interests. Finally, even though they are granted as a means to
achieve the appropriate power balance between shareholders and managers, basic shareholder rights lose significant value in the context of modern, indirect investment. Therefore, many proposed corporate reforms are
short-sighted because they aim to tweak the power balance between corporate managers and the traditional shareholders—direct owners. The
agency paradigm should be modernized to incorporate the unique interests of mutual fund investors with a definition of shareholder that includes this growing class of citizen shareholders.
III. GROWING CORPORATE SPACES IN SOCIETY
The economic reality of corporate functions, investments, and interconnectivity further supports incorporating the citizen shareholder
identity into the agency paradigm.
In 1932, Adolf Berle wrote that the “administration of corporations—peculiarly, a few hundred large corporations—is now the crux of
142. For example, most 401(k) plans offer a variety of funds with different investment strategies or goals, such as international equity-focused funds, fixed income funds, U.S. equity funds,
target-date retirement funds, and bond funds. Those categories, particularly the international and
U.S. equity funds, are often further subdivided to be an index fund to mirror the market and thus
offer a sample of securities from the top performing companies listed on a certain exchange, or are
categories according to the asset value of the participating companies (i.e., small, mid, and large
capitalization funds), or whether the participating companies are considered to be value or growth
securities. See, e.g., WellPoint 401K Retirement Savings Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq
.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=993# (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
143. See, e.g., infra Figure 2: Interconnectedness between Mutual Funds, Corporate 401(k)
Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan.
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American industrial life.”144 The ubiquity of corporations has grown as
evidenced, in part, by the burgeoning number of American households
invested in the securities of publicly traded companies.145 As more invest
in corporations, the capitalization levels of corporations rise,146 and with
that the production and revenue power of those corporations increase.
The rise in corporate revenues has also been accompanied by an emergence of private entities performing public functions, such as health care,
retirement savings, and participation in the political process.
The result is that “corporate spaces” in society are increasing. I use
the phrase corporate spaces to refer to the size and scope of corporations
in terms of revenue amounts, number of employees, and number of investors. It also reflects the concentration of wealth among the top companies,147 demonstrating the tremendous power that can be wielded by a
few private actors. Additionally, the phrase encompasses the public functions performed by corporations and how economic interests are inextricably intertwined with social and political interests, as discussed below.
Using 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures from the World
Bank and publicly available information about 2010 corporate revenues,
I created a ranking of the top economies in the world, including both private (corporations) and public economies (countries).148 Similar figures
have been relied upon in corporate law scholarship, but much of it is now
out-dated.149 My results, based on 2010 data, are consistent with earlier
conclusions from older data. 150
144. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1365 (1932).
145. See supra notes 52–56; see also Harrison Hong et. al., Social Interaction and StockMarket Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137, 137–38 (2004), available at http://economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/stein/files/Social_InteractionJofF.pdf (discussing the growing trend of stock ownership and
the reasons for it).
146. See Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1428 (noting the recent “influx of individual investors into
the capital markets . . . .”).
147. For example, looking at 2010 data, the top 5% of companies whose primary listing is on
an American stock exchange accounted for “70% ($10.6 trillion) of the market value and 90% ($765
billion) of the total profit . . . .” They Are the 5%, supra note 31.
148. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations
by Revenue in 2010.
149. While corporate law scholarship has included similar claims, the data supporting those
claims were from the late 1990s. I did not originally intend to do original research for this Article,
but concluded that the earlier assertions were an important component of my argument, and if to be
included, had to be modernized. See, e.g., Siebecker, supra note 149, at 171; Tsoutsoura, supra note
149, at 4.
150. Compare this data to a 1999 study of the top 100 economies of the world, measured by the
GDP and corporate revenue, which revealed that 51 were U.S.-based corporations and 49 were countries. SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVENAGH, INST. OF POLICY STUDIES, TOP 200: THE RISE OF
CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 3 (2000), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/files/2452/top200.pdf; see
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In 2010, 43 of the top 100 economies in the world were corporations, 33 of which are traded on U.S. exchanges or are U.S.-based.151 The
100 top-earning corporations ranked among the top 162 economies of the
world. Demonstrating a strong concentration of corporate rankings in the
100−162 range, 57 companies ranked between numbers 100 and 162 of
the top economies of the world.152 Of the 100 top-earning corporations
discussed herein, 65 are U.S.-based corporations or are traded on U.S.regulated exchanges.153
Figure 1: Top Economies in 2010

also Michael Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 161, 171 (2010) (describing the influence of corporations in modern society in terms of
political voice and economic power); Margarita Tsoutsoura, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Financial Performance 5 (Mar. 2004) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www
.escholarship.org/us/item/111799p2 (describing prior research exploring the link between financial
success and corporate social responsibility and describing current methodologies that confirm the
existence of a positive correlation); Trade Liberalization Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2011) (“51 of the 100 largest economies in the
world are corporations. The Top 500 multinational corporations account for nearly 70 percent of the
worldwide trade; this percentage has steadily increased over the past twenty years.” (citing Corporate Globalization Fact Sheet, CORPWATCH, (Mar. 22, 2001), http://www.corpwatch.org/arti
cle.php?id=378)).
151. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations
by Revenue in 2010.
152. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations
by Revenue in 2010.
153. See infra Table 8: Top 100 Corporations by Revenue in 2010.
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This section provides data documenting the public functions of 3 of
the top 100 corporations: Wal-Mart (ranked the #1 corporation and #24
on the integrated list); International Business Machines (IBM) (ranked as
the #48 corporation and #106 on the integrated list); and WellPoint
(ranked the #100 corporation and #162 on the integrated list).154 Additionally, this section discusses companies’ relationship to and dependence on the securities market by discussing their 401(k) plans and institutional investors. Later, in Part III.B, I discuss the case study companies in
greater detail.
The scale of the modern corporation is expanding on all fronts—
increasing in the number of investors, size, and concentration of economic power. This increase in corporate spaces raises questions probing both
the actual and the ideal relationship between corporations and society.155
A. Public Functions of Private Entities
The ways in which private entities have evolved to serve increasingly public functions suggests that corporate space in society is increasing. Corporate involvement with public functions further emphasizes the
significance of the citizen shareholder identity, one that captures the interests and realities of a majority of investors. Berle wrote that a “major
function” of the modern American corporation is to “provide safety, security, or means of support for that part of the community . . . .”156 In
other words: private entities perform public functions. Corporations earn
returns for investors and employ a workforce, both private functions;
corporations are also key actors in the provision of health insurance, the
building of individual retirement savings, and the election of candidates
for office, all public functions.157
154. Id.
155. The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power
which can compete on equal terms with the modern state—economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the
corporation while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every effort
to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dominate the state. The future may see the economic organism now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possible even superseding it as the
dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might well
be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business
practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 357.
156. Berle, supra note 145, at 1365.
157. Wade, supra note 37, at 325. (“When private companies manage prisons, public schools,
and hospitals, and distribute welfare benefits, the inmates, students, patients, and welfare recipients
they purport to serve become human commodities that are more like the widgets manufactured by
more typical corporations than they are like the constituencies of traditional companies.”).
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If corporations are private entities, when, how, and why did they
begin performing public functions?158 Are corporations larger and more
widely invested in because of the public functions that they serve, or do
they serve increasingly public functions because of the size or scale of
corporations, which is fueled in part by investments? The answers are
difficult to pinpoint because corporate space impacts the terms of investment and the public roles performed by corporations that, in turn,
augment the space that corporations occupy in society. The cycle is easiest to see in the context of retirement savings where stock investment is
the predominant (and growing) means of individual saving for retirement, which in turn impacts the space that corporations occupy. Tax incentives, default rules like automatic enrollment, and information asymmetries between mutual fund managers and the average investor, all encourage employee participation in corporate-sponsored retirement plans.
As more citizens are invested in securities for the purpose of individual
retirement savings, the link between the activities of private enterprises
and the financial security of the country as a whole is evident: private
entities with public impact.
The assumed dichotomy between public and private functions,159
which is a foundational principle in corporate law, no longer reflects the
corporate reality in which a majority of Americans invest. It is a tenet of
corporate law that corporations are private entities,160 created by the
state,161 governed by contract,162 and subject only to certain state and,
where applicable, federal regulations.163 Because corporations are private

158. For a discussion of the early connection between private entities and public functions,
specifically in the railroad industry, see JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, A
HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 132–66 (1997).
159. Id.; see also Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 68–70 (2009).
160. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real
Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATE LAW 12–29 (2nd ed. 2009).
161. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 161, at 12–13; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991) (noting the “many actors” who collectively participate in the firm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4, 25 (2002) (referencing state corporate law statutes as the foundation of
corporate law); Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 844 (“Although different states within the United States
have different corporate codes, these codes have many similarities.”).
162. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 162, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 162, at 9–11.
163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §101 (2011) (establishing the requirements for forming
and maintaining a corporation); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (2010) (establishing disclosure requirements for
directors and officers with ownership interests of 10% or more).
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entities, often viewed as associations of their owners (shareholders),164
corporations are vested with certain rights that are similar to or derivative
from those held by individual shareholders.165 The agency paradigm is
premised on the need for corporate law to ensure that those who control a
corporation do so in service to the individual owners. As already explained, the identity of a “shareholder” is evolving. This section discusses how corporations’ roles are also evolving, and whether those changes
justify modernizing the agency paradigm to accommodate the full scope
of interests held by modern investors. I conclude that yoking public functions to the function of private enterprises further demonstrates the need
to supplement the traditional shareholder identity with that of the citizen
shareholder.
B. Case Study Company Data: The Public Functions of Wal-Mart,
IBM, and WellPoint
The case studies illustrate the arguments made in this section—that
corporations are performing increasingly public functions, that corporations are interconnected, and that modern shareholders’ economic interests are related to and have an impact on social and political interests.
This section presents data related to the top (Wal-Mart), middle (IBM),
and bottom (WellPoint) U.S.-based companies on the top 100 corporate
revenue list.166 This section also identifies the public actions of these

164. If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing
citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the
antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban
political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate form.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 904 (2010).
165. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and
women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person’s right to
speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. Surely the
dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can
be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual American.” It is the speech of
many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a
business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on
the simplistic ground that it is not “an individual American.”
Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the
Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 427–30
(2012).
166. See Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in Case
Study Companies.
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three private entities and demonstrates how the broader interests of citizen shareholders are impacted by corporate action.
Table 2: Case Study Companies & Public Functions167

Provide Health Insurance
Provide 401(k)
Political Spending
Political Action Committee
Lobbyist Expenditures

Wal-Mart168
(#1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
$6.1M
(2010)171

IBM169
(#48)
Yes
Yes
No
No
None
reported

WellPoint170
(#100)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
$20.3M
(2010)172

All three companies provide health insurance to employees.173 Similarly, all three provide 401(k) plans for employees. Not surprisingly, the
funds provided in the three companies’ 401(k) plans include funds in the

167. 401(k) participation is available to full- and part-time employees, but health care coverage
is limited to full-time employees at Wal-Mart, and is uncertain for IBM and WellPoint, although
their business models are unlikely to be as reliant on part-time employees as the major retail chain is.
168. Careers: Benefits, WALMART, http://walmartstores.com/careers/7750.aspx (last visited
May 8, 2012).
169. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC., http://www.ibm.com (last visited May 8,
2012); see also Pay & Benefits, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/employment/us/li_pay_benefits
.shtml; IBM Policies, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/policy5.shtml (last visited May
8, 2012) (“It is IBM’s long-standing policy that we participate in politics as private citizens, not as
IBMers. Therefore, it is the policy of the IBM Company not to make contributions of resources such
as money, goods or services to political candidates or parties. This policy applies equally in all countries where IBM does business, regardless of whether or not such contributions are considered legal
in any host country.”).
170. WELLPOINT, INC., http://www.wellpoint.com/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); Wellness Programs,
WELLPOINT,
http://www.careersatwellpoint.com/Wellness-Program.aspx;
Benefits,
WELLPOINT, http://www.careersatwellpoint.com/Benefits.aspx?clicked=0 (last visited May 8, 2012);
Wellpoint, Inc. Wellpac-2010 FEC PAC-Qualified Committee, FIND THE DATA, http://fec-politicalcommittees.findthedata.org/l/7505/Wellpoint-Inc-Wellpac (last visited May 8, 2012). Note that
WellPoint is the parent of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Anthem entities, and thus, their contributions
are included in the data reported directly above.
171. Annual Lobbying by Wal-Mart Stores, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00093054&cycle=2010 (last visited May 8, 2012).
172. This figure includes the spending of subsidiaries like Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Anthem.
Wellpac-2010 FEC PAC-Qualified Committee, supra note 171; Blue Cross/Blue Shield Client Profile: Summary, 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000
000109&year=2010.
173. See supra notes 169−71.
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top mutual fund companies (see Table 3). Political spending is discussed
separately below in Part III.E.
Table 3: Mutual Funds Included in Case Study 401(k) Plans
Top Mutual Funds
Vanguard
American
Fidelity
PIMCO
BlackRock
Total funds offered

Part of WalMart 401(k)174
Ø
1 fund
2 funds
2 funds
1 fund
16 funds

Part of IBM
401(k)175
12 funds
Ø
Ø
2 funds
Ø
21 funds

Part of WellPoint 401(k)176
15 funds
2 funds
Ø
1 fund
Ø
30 funds

174. Wal-Mart Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq.com/LTI
System/f401k_view.action?ID=995 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Plan options include the following:
American Funds EuroPacific Blend, Barclays iShares Foreign Blend Index Trust, Laudus Mondrian
International Equity Trust, Fidelity Advisor International Small Capital Equity Trust, iShares Russell
1000 Index, David NY Venture A, Rainier Large Capital Equity Index, Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small/Mid Capital Growth Fund, GAMCO Westwood Small Cap Equity Fund, BlackRock Inflation Protected Bond, PIMCO Total Return Bond Fund, Prudential Core Plus Bond III, Stable Value
Government Bonds, PIMCO All Asset Institutional Index, and Fidelity Advisor Global Balanced
Asset Fund. Id.
175. International Business Machines (IBM) 401K Plus Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.my
planiq.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=675# (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Plan funds include
the following: ING Global Real Estate, Vanguard REIT Index, Vanguard Pacific Stock Index, Vanguard European Stock Index, State Street Global Advisors, International Stock Selection, PIMCO
Commodity fund, PIMCO Emerging Markets Bond, Vanguard Inflation-Protected Bonds, Vanguard
Long-Term Investment-Grade Bonds, Vanguard Short-Term Bond index, Vanguard Large Cap
Index, Vanguard Total Stock Market Index, Vanguard Growth Index, Vanguard Value Index, State
Street Global Advisors Small/Mid Capital Fund, Vanguard Small Capital Growth Index, Vanguard
Small Capital Value Index, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Total Bond Market, and a money market
account. Id.
176. WellPoint 401K Retirement Savings Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq.com/LTI
System/f401k_view.action?ID=993# (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Participating funds include the
following: Dimensional Fund Advisors Emerging Markets, Vanguard Total International Stock
Index, Van Kampen International Growth Fund, PIMCO Total Return Bond Fund, Vanguard Total
Bond Market Index, Vanguard Institutional Index, Wells Fargo Advantage Index Fund, American
Funds Growth Fund of America, Touchstone Sands Capital Select Growth Fund, Vanguard
PRIMECAP Fund, American Beacon Large Capital Value Fund, Vanguard Windsor II Large Value
Fund, Vanguard Mid-Capitalization Index Fund, Vanguard Explorer Small Growth Fund, Wells
Fargo Advantage Small Capital Growth Fund, Goldman Sachs Small Capital Value Fund, Vanguard
Wellington Fund, Vanguard Target Retirement Income Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones
Target Fund, Vanguard Money Market Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2010, Vanguard Target Retirement 2015 Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2030 Fund, Vanguard Target Retirement 2035 Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2040 Fund, Vanguard Target Retirement 2045 Fund, and Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2050 Fund. Id.
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The case study companies also serve as an investment source for
many of the top companies and top mutual funds discussed in this Article, as well as to government pension plans.177 Securities Exchange
Commission form 13F178 filings identify institutional investors, of a certain size, with holdings in publicly traded companies, including the case
study companies.179 While all of the top mutual funds are invested in the
case study companies to some degree, seven of the eleven mutual funds
discussed above own 200,000 shares or more in the case study companies180 For an additional illustration of the level of intra-company investment, see Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government
Institutional Investors in Case Study Companies, included in the Appendix, ranking institutional investors among the top 100 companies, top
mutual funds discussed herein, and government pension plans in the
three case study companies.

177. See infra Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with 200,000 Shares or More in Case Study
Companies (2010); Table 5: Top Mutual Funds in 2010.
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011); see also Form 13(f)—Reports Filed by Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form
13f.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
179. Form 13F is a report required by the SEC for institutional investment managers with
more than $100M assets under their control, including banks, insurance companies, broker/dealers,
corporations, and pension funds. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011); SECURITIES & EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Division of Investment Management, Frequently Asked Questions about Form 13F ,
(Sept. 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm.
180. The cut-off point for tracking investments is an arbitrary selection made by the author.
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Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with Significant Investment
in Case Study Companies181
Mutual Funds
Vanguard
American
Fidelity
PIMCO
TIAA-CREF
Franklin Templeton
T. Rowe Price
Columbia
Oppenheimer Funds
JP Morgan
BlackRock

Invested in
Wal-Mart
x

Invested in
IBM
x

Invested in
WellPoint
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

Table 4 highlights the interconnectedness of corporate investment.
This point is further illustrated by the following diagram:
Figure 2: Interconnectedness Between Mutual Funds, Corporate 401(k)
Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan.

181. List of Section 13(f) filings for the case study companies on file with the author.

2012]

The Citizen Shareholder

1339

Figure 2 illustrates the level of investment between the case study
companies and the top mutual funds. The results are not surprising, but
the visual representation conveys more than words alone. Each of the
three case study companies are listed along with the names of the top
mutual funds participating in their 401(k) plans. For Wal-Mart, the fund
participants are American Funds, Fidelity, PIMCO, and BlackRock; for
IBM, the participants are Vanguard and PIMCO; for WellPoint, the participants are American Funds, PIMCO, and Vanguard. Each of the top
mutual fund family participants has some level of investment182 in each
of the three case study companies, with T.Rowe Price, Oppenheimer, JP
Morgan Chase and TIAA-CREF having reported holdings of over
200,000.
This interconnectedness provides another justification for conceptualizing modern mutual fund investors as citizen shareholders. Moreover, corporate interconnectedness underscores the universal investor theory: what a modern investor owns is a share in the market as a whole, not
a share in an individual company.183 The diagram illustrates that risk is
not isolated to one company or even within one industry for the citizen
shareholder. The financial health of corporations—and therefore the financial health of their investors—depends on the health of other corporations and the market as a whole.
Additionally, the level of intra-company and mutual fund investment in the top companies demonstrates how closely tied personal retirement savings are to corporate performance. Corporations, as private
entities, perform a public function by serving as the foundation of individual retirement savings. The number of government-sponsored pension
funds invested in the case study companies further evidences this public
function. For example, of the reported institutional investors owning
200,000 shares of stock or more in the case study companies, forty were
government-sponsored pension plans.184 This also means that while the
182. Here I am discussing any corporate investment, not a significant investment of 200,000
shares or .01% as gathered from form 13(f) filings.
183. Fairfax, supra note 78, at 83–85; HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 21.
184. See infra Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in
Case Study Companies. Institutional investors are listed in rank order by size of holdings, from
largest to smallest until the cut-off threshold of 200,000 shares. Wal-Mart had twenty registered,
U.S. public pension investors in 2010: CALPERS; N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund; N.Y. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Fla. State Bd. of Admin.; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State of Wis. Inv. Bd.;
State of N.J. Common Pension Fund; Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ohio;
Tex. Teacher Ret. Sys.; Va. Ret. Sys.; State Treasurer of Mich.; Colo. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; Tex.
Permanent Sch. Fund; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Pub. Sector Pension Inv. Bd.; Commonwealth of Pa.
Pub. Schs.; Ky. Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; N.M. Educ. Ret. Bd.; and Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. IBM had
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stock market investment numbers are currently at 54% of American
households, there is an even greater number of people (households dependent on government-backed pensions for retirement savings) for
whom the private performance of corporations will determine, in part,
their individual economic stability.
C. Growing Corporate Spaces: Health Care
As demonstrated with the case studies, providing health insurance
to employees is one way that private corporations perform a public function that impacts individuals.185 Employer-provided health insurance as a
form of employee benefit is a primary means through which Americans
obtain health insurance coverage.186 In 2010, 45% of Americans received
health insurance through an employer-based plan.187 Compare that with
the 25% of Americans who received health insurance through the government in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, and military/veterans insurance, and the 17% of Americans who remain uninsured.188
Access to health care is a meaningful measure of economic and social stability and is tracked domestically and internationally as an indicator of stability and health.189 Heath care is internationally considered a

seventeen registered, U.S. public pension investors in 2010: N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund;
CALPERS; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Fla. State Bd. of Admin.; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.;
State of Wis. Inv. Bd.; Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ohio; Colo. Pub.
Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; N.J. Div. of Inv.; Tex. Teacher Ret. Sys.; Tex. Permanent Sch. Fund; State
Treasurer of Mich.; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Ky. Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Commonwealth of Pa. Pub.
Schs.; and Va. Ret. Sys. WellPoint had twelve registered, U.S. public pension investors in 2010:
N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund; CALPERS; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys.
of Ohio; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State of Wis. Inv. Bd.; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Ohio Pub.
Emps. Ret. Sys.; State of N.J. Common Pension Fund; Colo. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; Tex. Permanent Sch. Fund; and State Treasurer of Mich.
185. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 34, at 852 (“[T]he corporation, as the nation’s
primary employer, becomes the primary supplier of employee welfare provisions preferred by the
state . . . ,” including health insurance.).
186. See, e.g., Danny King, Fewer Americans Get Employer Health Insurance, DAILY
FINANCE.COM, (Mar. 7. 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/03/07/fewer-americans-get-em
ployer-health-insurance/ (asserting that employer-provided health insurance accounts for the coverage of 45% of Americans).
187. Elizabeth Mendes, Employer-Based Health Insurance Continues to Trend Down, GALLUP
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150692/Employer-Based-Health-Insurance-ContinuesTrend-Down.aspx.
188. Id.
189. MARK W. STANTON, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, EMPLOYERSPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: TRENDS IN COST AND ACCESS, (2004), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/empspria.htm; John M. Eisenberg & Elaine J. Power, Transforming Insurance Coverage Into Quality Health Care: Voltage Drops From Potential to Delivered
Quality, JAMA, Oct. 25, 2000, at 2100, 2101.
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human right190 and remains at the center of political debates in the United
States.191 Health insurance is one way to ensure appropriate access to
health care and is an indicator of overall health.192 Private employers,
190. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (iii) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(iii), art. 25
(Dec. 10, 1948).
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full
realization
of
this
right
shall
include
those
necessary
for:
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the
healthy
development
of
the
child;
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other
diseases;
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12 (1966).
191. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d
1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011) (challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 608 (2011) (granting cert. review for 648 F.3d 1235 on the severability issue);
Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (granting cert. on the minimum
coverage issue in Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235); Florida v. Dept. of Human & Health
Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (granting cert. review for Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235, on
the issue of Congress’s spending power and ability to link federal funding to state compliance). CNN
reports on its “Top Campaign Issues” that health care is a top issue and provides further commentary:
Most Republican candidates are pushing to “repeal and replace” much of the health care
reform bill passed by a Democratically controlled Congress and signed into law by President Obama in spring 2010. The law has proved less popular than Obama and Democrats
anticipated when they used considerable political capital to pass it. But the GOP is also
exposed on health care. Gov. Mitt Romney is plagued by comparisons between the Democratic law and a similar bill he supported and signed while governor of Massachusetts.
Election Center: Top Campaign Issues, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2012/campaignissues.html.
192. Health care coverage promotes access to medical goods and services, as well as
providing financial security against unexpected or serious illness . . . . Most OECD countries have achieved near-universal coverage of health-care costs for a core set of services,
which usually include consultations with doctors and specialists, tests and examinations,
and surgical and therapeutic procedures.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD INDICATORS
132, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/28/49105858.pdf. The United States is one of four
OCED countries that does not provide universal health coverage. Id. The OECD cautions that “[t]he
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many of whom are corporations, provide health insurance for nearly half
of all Americans and by doing so perform a public function.
When corporations are the predominant providers of health insurance (through employee benefit plans), private economic conditions influence the provision of that public function. Combining shareholder returns and health insurance in the same analysis demonstrates the blending of economic, social, and political interests for investors and citizens
alike. For example, the number of Americans with health insurance has
been declining since the economic crisis in 2008; the sharpest decline, in
fact, is among individuals who receive their health insurance through
employer-sponsored plans.193 For example, in 2011, Wal-Mart—the largest revenue-producing company, ranked as the 24th largest economy in
the world,194 and the largest private employer195—announced a new policy that it would not provide health insurance for new, part-time employees.196 Corporate policies are likely to impact health insurance coverage
rates directly and access to health care indirectly. In the face of insurance
premium increases at 9% a year, the debate regarding health care coverage and its implications for business (and vice versa) is likely to continue.197
The issue of health insurance can serve as a lens through which to
examine the bifurcated interests of citizen shareholders. This issue has
direct economic consequences for corporate returns as well as discernible
social and political consequences. Discussing health insurance solely in
light of the economic interests of shareholders overlooks an important
component of the interests involved, particularly when half of Americans
problem of persistent uninsurance is a major barrier to receiving health care, and more broadly, to
reducing health inequalities among population groups . . . .” Id.
193. Mendes, supra note 187; see also King, supra note 186.
194. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010.
195. Nation’s Largest Employers, NEW YORK JOB SOURCE, http://nyjobsource.com/largestem
ployers.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); see also America’s Ten Largest Employers, 24/7 WALL
STREET, http://247wallst.com/2011/04/24/americas-ten-largest-employers (last visited Apr. 5, 2011)
(“Wal-Mart is both the largest private employer in the world as well as the largest company ranked
by annual revenue.”).
196. Mendes, supra note 187; Steven Greenhouse & Reed Abelson, Wal-Mart Cuts Some
Health Care Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/
wal-mart-cuts-some-health-care-benefits.html?pagewanted=all.
The increased cost of health insurance is a central fact in any discussion of health policy
and health delivery. As annual premiums surge beyond $13,000 for an average family,
costs are blamed for rising uninsured and ‘under-insurance.’ For those Americans who
are fully-covered, these cost realities affect employers, both large and small . . . .
Health Insurance: Premiums and Increases, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
(Aug. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14514.
197. Greenhouse & Abelson, supra note 196.
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are invested in the stock market and nearly the same number of people
obtain their insurance from the companies listed thereon.
For example, this Article focuses on citizen shareholders—mutual
fund investors participating in employer-sponsored plans—who have an
interest in market stability and performance as a whole. A corporate decision regarding health insurance may impact both the workforce and the
market as a whole. For example, the recently excluded part-time employees without medical insurance may see doctors less, buy fewer prescription drugs and health-related products, as well as incur higher costs associated with emergency care needs exacerbated by delayed treatment.
While enduring these economic consequences, if the employee also invests in a 401k plan, she is likely to be indirectly invested in Wal-Mart
through several avenues (mutual fund invested in Wal-Mart and companies included in fund also are likely to hold Wal-Mart stock).
D. Growing Corporate Spaces: Retirement
As documented above, investment through employer-sponsored retirement plans is the primary method of market entry for citizen shareholders and demonstrates the growing dependence of Americans on the
performance of the market as a means to secure individual financial stability.
The fastest growing class of private investment is in mutual funds
through the proliferation of employer-sponsored retirement vehicles such
as the 401(k) and other defined contribution plans.198 Private wealth savings,199 largely for retirement,200 is achieved primarily through 401(k)
198. Employer-sponsored plans are also called defined contribution plans and include the
401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, and 457 plans for government employees. Individual retirement accounts
(IRAs)
were designed with two goals when they were created in 1974 under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). First, they provide individuals not covered by
workplace retirement plans with an opportunity to save for retirement on their own. Second, they allow workers who are leaving jobs a means to preserve the tax benefits and
growth opportunities that employer-sponsored retirement plans provide.
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 103–104, 112.
199. It is a matter of experience that during two periods of man’s life, childhood and old
age, he can not support himself; and that sickness, childbearing, and incidental economic
readjustments will make even further lacunae. The only bridge, in our system, to cover
these gaps is private property. The common law has based its whole fabric on this premise.
Berle, supra note 145, at 1369.
200. Mutual funds play a key role in achieving both the long- and short-term savings
goals of U.S. households. In 2010, 74 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated that their primary financial goal for their fund investments was saving for retirement.
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plans, whereby an employer partners with an investment company to offer investment opportunities to the employees through a limited offering
of special funds and products.201 The “choice” to invest is limited and
often encouraged by the pre-tax investment advantages and possibility
for employer matching funds.202
Similarly, the choice regarding how to invest is also limited and
constrained by the employer-sponsored plan. The nearly compulsory nature of stock ownership makes such investments closely mirror an employment tax with a residual, long-term personal benefit, much like the
intended framework of social security. The tax-like nature of employee
investment raises serious theoretical questions as to the appropriate role
of corporations and the responsibilities they bear to the individual investors and to society, perhaps elevating concerns such as long-term stability, sustainable practices, and research and development for longevity.
Mutual funds have also been evolving. The pool of assets managed
by U.S. mutual funds is increasing, as is the concentration of assets in the
top funds. The twenty-five largest funds managed 60% of the mutual
fund assets in 2000 and almost 75% in 2010.203 The market share of the

Ninety-one percent of households that owned mutual funds held shares inside workplace
retirement plans, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and other tax-deferred accounts.
Households were more likely to invest their retirement assets in long-term mutual funds
than in money market funds. Defined contribution (DC) retirement plans and IRA assets
held in stock, bond, and hybrid mutual funds totaled $4.3 trillion in 2010 and accounted
for 48 percent of those funds’ assets, whereas retirement account assets in money market
funds were $351 billion, or 13% of those funds’ assets.
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 84.
201. Taub, supra note 5, at 851.
202. Id.; see also The 401k Advantage, PROFIT SHARING/401K COUNCIL OF AMERICA, http://
www.401k.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uEnqkTNfg14%3D&tabid=71&mid=410 (last visited Apr.
5, 2012) (“401(k) contributions are made pretax, which means that when your money goes into the
plan it is not subject to federal income tax or most state and local income taxes. Likewise, investment earnings on your savings are not taxed until they are withdrawn from the plan.”); Lee Ann
Obringer, How 401 K Plans Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://money.howstuffworks.com/per
sonal-finance/retirement-planning/401k2.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
“Without the tax incentives, Section 401(k) plans would just become an investment account with a
great deal of restrictions on the accounts.” Beckett G. Cantley, The Cure Causes New Symptoms:
Capital Control Effects of Tax Enforcement, Gold Regulation, and Retirement Reform, 7 S.C. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 75, 106 (2010) (discussing the effect on 401(k) plans if government-regulated accounts became the new mechanism for individual retirement savings and the tax advantage of 401(k)
plans was eliminated).
203. The top eleven mutual funds, by asset values, are listed in Table 5. “The share of assets
managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 74 percent in 2010 from 68 percent in 2000.” ICI 2011
FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23.
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top eleven funds is almost 55%,204 achieved, in part, by participating in
employer-sponsored retirement plans.
The top mutual funds are listed below in Table 5.
Table 5: Top Mutual Funds in 2010 205
Firm
Vanguard
American
Fidelity
TIAA-CREF208
PIMCO
Franklin Templeton
T. Rowe Price
Columbia
Oppenheimer Funds
JP Morgan
BlackRock

Total Assets206
(in U.S. $ million)
1,200,000
814,000
743,000
453,000
449,000
323,000
247,000
146,000
131,000
130,000
127,000

Market
Share207
15.58%
11.01%
10.05%
5.8%
6.07%
4.37%
3.34%
1.97%
1.78%
1.75%
1.72%

Unsurprisingly, there is a significant cross-investment among the
mutual funds listed herein (Table 5), and the top 100 companies, listed in
Table 8.

204. Id. (“In addition, the share of assets managed by the largest 10 firms in 2010 was 53 percent, up from the 44 percent share managed by the largest 10 firms in 2000.”).
205. Largest Mutual Fund Firms, INVESTMENT NEWS, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/gallery?Site=CI&Date=20111012&Category=free&ArtNo=101209993&Ref=PH&Params=
Itemnr=1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (based on data available from Morningstar’s Fund Flow Direct
Database at http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/asp/subject.aspx?xmlfile=2955.xml&ad=van).
206. Id.
207. Id. Market share indicated by the Investment News ranking is based on a U.S. Mutual
fund market of $7.69 trillion assets. The 2011 Investment Company Factbook, however, reports the
total U.S. mutual fund market at $11.8 trillion. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 197. The
market share percentage for TIAA-CREF is calculated from the $7.69 trillion number used in the
rest of the rankings.
208. Press Release, TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF and the Future Fund Partner on Ownership of
685 Third Avenue Tower, (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about/press/
about_us/releases/pressrelease376.html (“With more than USD$453 billion in combined assets under
management as of December 31, 2010, TIAA-CREF is best known as the leading provider of retirement services in the academic, research, medical and cultural fields and one of the largest institutional real estate investors in the U.S.”); see also Who We Serve, TIAA-CREF, http://www.tiaa-cref
.org/public/about/identity/who_we_serve/index.html (Apr. 5, 2012).
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Private investment, which serves the quasi-public function of retirement savings, generates private economic power and fuels concentration of wealth.209 As discussed in Part II, the nature of modern stock
ownership—through employer-sponsored retirement funds—erodes traditional, market-based checks on old agency problems in corporations. It
also increases the need for the system of investment to work fairly and
appropriately for both the security of the individual investor, as well as
for society which is dependent on the private provision of a public safety
net.210
E. Growing Corporate Spaces: Political Speech
As seen with the case study companies, political speech is a third
way in which corporations, as private entities, participate in or serve a
public function.211 Corporate actions funded by corporate treasuries have
decidedly political and democratic consequences.212 Even the SEC has
recognized the uniquely political components of corporate actions, describing political contributions as the “type of social issue that might be
significant to shareholders even though not significant to the bottom
line.”213 Additionally, increasing corporate spaces have social and political impact. “As corporations gain political power and encroach more
deeply into territory once solely occupied by government, the private
boardroom rather than the public forum represents the relevant battlefield
for determining the most important aspects of our lives.”214

209. See generally Edward A. Zelinksy, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J.
451 (2004) (discussing the rise and role of defined contribution plans such as the 401(k)).
210. “The role of institutional investors is growing in many countries, with many economies
moving away from ‘pay as you go’ retirement systems. This increased delegation of investment has
raised the need for good corporate governance arrangements.” STIJN CLAESSENS, GLOBAL
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM OF THE WORLD BANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT 7 (2003), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus_1
_CG_and_Development/$FILE/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf.
211. See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 141, at 392 (“[T]he Supreme Court used Citizens
United as an opportunity to expand corporate speech rights by overturning Austin’s and McConnell’s
limits on corporate political spending.”).
212. The decisions affecting some of the most important aspects of our individual and
communal lives now get made inside the boardroom rather than in the public
eye . . . . [C]orporate actors may likely dominate the political agenda and the public opinion on any matters that remain open for discussion in the public realm. In some real
sense, the ability to direct corporate decisions represents the ability to control political
life.
Siebecker, supra note 149, at 164–65.
213. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 37 (citing to a 1996 no action letter).
214. Siebecker, supra note 149, at 169.
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While restricted from making direct candidate donations,215 corporations participate in political speech through (1) contributions to political action committees (PACs), (2) expenditures on direct lobbying efforts, and (3) the use of corporate funds to encourage employees to support or oppose a particular candidate or issue.216 Corporations are actively using the channels for political speech.217 For example, in 2010, reported spending on lobbying was over $2.6 billion, with a majority coming from corporations or corporate-backed organizations or associations
such as the Chamber of Commerce.218 Additionally, § 441b of the
McCain-Feingold Act contained exemptions for media corporations219
and for communications of “non-profit organizations and political organization[s] if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided
directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”220

215. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.) (addressing the increased
role of soft money in campaign financing and the proliferation of issue-advocacy advertisements).
Under § 441b, corporations were prohibited from “using general treasury funds to make direct contributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of
a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.”
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
216. See KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 302
(7th ed. 2011) (“Profit-making corporations . . . may support PACs and engage in partisan communication—including advocating the election of specific candidates—provided the communications
are directed only to the corporate . . . ‘family.’ A corporation may use corporate funds to urge management, shareholders, and their families to vote for a specific candidate . . . .”).
217. For example, OpenSecrets.org reported on April 16, 2012 that outside groups such as
parties, Super PACs, corporations, and other groups had spent $103,293,322 in the 2012 election.
Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/. Corporations,
available to fund independent political expenditures after the decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010), provided Super PACs with 19% of their budgets in 2010 and 23% (thus far) in the
2012 election cycle. T. W. Farnam, Corporations Are Sending More Contributions to Super PACs,
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/corporations-are-sending-morecontributions-to-super-pacs/2012/02/02/gIQAL4dYlQ_story.html.
218. Bennett Roth & Alex Knott, Lobbying Dollars Dip for the First Time in Years, ROLL
CALL (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_75/-202990-1.html; see also
Who’s Up, Who’s Down, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last
visited Dec. 22, 2012) (providing data on total lobbying expenditures by year and breaking down
annual and quarterly lobbying reports by industry and date).
219. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—(i) any news story,
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper,
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political committee, or candidate . . . .”).
220. Id. § 441b(c)(2). Nonprofit corporations that were formed solely to promote political
ideas, that did not collect funds from for-profit corporations, and that did not engage in business
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The 2010 U.S. Supreme Court opinion Citizens United v. FEC221
expanded avenues for corporate political speech by eliminating restrictions on political expenditures made by corporations and labor unions that are uncoordinated with the candidate, the candidate’s committee, or the party.222 Outside spending, the type of political speech now
available to corporations after Citizens United, is a rapidly growing category, with significant increases in the 2010 midterm elections and predicted growth for 2012.223 The rapid growth in this category of spending
is also attributable to the creation of the Super PAC. Super PACs are a
fundraising entity created by the outcome of a federal court case,
SpeechNow.org v. FEC,224 that expands the independent expenditure
rights created in Citizens United.225 Super PACs are technically known as
“independent expenditure-only committees” and can raise unlimited
sums of money from corporations, unions, associations, and individuals,
and then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political
candidates.226
activities were also exempted from the restrictions on corporate expenditures under § 441b. FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986).
221. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.
222. See id. at 909 (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made
by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). Earlier, in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court had reasoned that uncoordinated expenditures undermine the
value of such speech to the candidate and therefore decrease the threat of quid pro quo reciprocation
from the candidate or elected official. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 908.
223. Dana Bash, Cash Flows in 2010 Cycle, CNN POLITICS, Oct. 27, 2010, http://politicalticker
.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/27/cash-flows-in-2010-cycle; Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2012).
224. SpeechNow.org v. FEC., 599 F.3d 686 (2010) (holding unconstitutional a provision limiting contributions by individuals to political committees that made only independent expenditures).
“The FEC has applied Citizens United and SpeechNOW to allow unlimited contributions to, and
expenditures by such PACs known as expenditure-only committees or SuperPACs.” Jan Witold
Baran et al., Political Contributions and Expenditures by Corporations, 1901 PLI/Corp 137,
153 (2011); see also FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-9; FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-11.
225. But after recent changes in campaign finance laws, these newly empowered PACs
are allowed to raise unlimited funds which they can donate to a campaign with few restrictions. Since the 2008 presidential race, “the biggest change is the growth of these super PACs that can accept unlimited contributions and spend unlimited amounts,” said
Anthony Corrado, a professor of government at Colby College in Waterville, Maine.
Soaring PAC Donations May Fund a Shocking $6 Billion 2012 Election, RAW STORY (Nov. 3,
2011), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/11/03/pac-donations-fund-6-billion-2012-election/.
226. Technically known as independent expenditure-only committees, Super PACs may
raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals,
then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political candidates. Super
PACs must, however, report their donors to the Federal Election Commission on a
monthly or quarterly basis—the Super PACs choice—as a traditional PAC would. Unlike
traditional PACs, Super PACs are prohibited from donating money directly to political
candidates.
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Through existing channels for corporate money to enter the political debate and the increased avenues provided by independent expenditures and Super PACs, the category of outside spending outpaced the
overall increases in election spending by 565%227 between the 2006 and
the 2010 midterm election years. The upcoming presidential election in
2012 will further document the level of corporate involvement in the political debate for the election of federal candidates.228 While controversial
as to the appropriate role of corporate political speech, the numbers
demonstrate that corporate money is playing an undeniable role in political elections.
The following table demonstrates the increasing role that corporatesponsored money plays in political elections.

Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last visited Feb.
10, 2012).
227. The total cost of the 2006 midterm election cycle is reported at $2.85 billion, with $37
million in independent expenditures. The total cost of the 2010 midterm election cycle was reported
at $3.6 billion, with over $210 million in independent expenditures. The growth in overall cost of the
election between 2006 and 2010 was 26%, whereas the increase in independent expenditures from
these two cycles was 319%. The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open
secrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating the reported costs of the elections); Total
Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Political Parties, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Data after the 2012
presidential election should provide a more complete picture regarding the role of corporate political
spending in the form of independent political expenditures.
228. See, e.g., W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).
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Table 6: Election Spending 2006−2012229
2006 Election
Midterm
2008 Election
Presidential
2010 Election
Midterm
2012 Election
Presidential

Total cost
Independent
Expenditures
Total cost
Independent
Expenditures
Total cost
Independent
Expenditures
Total cost
Independent
Expenditures

$2.85 B
$37 M
$5.3 B
$157 M
$3.6 B
$210 M
Estimated between
$6−7 B230
Unknown
(over $98 M 4/2012)

Corporate political speech raises three distinct concerns. First, corporate political speech is economically motivated speech231 that threatens
to commoditize the marketplace232 of political and social ideas and endeavors. The distorting nature of economically motivated speech is recognized in other areas of corporate regulation, including the Commercial
Speech Doctrine,233 and such speech receives a discounted level of protection under the First Amendment.234
229. The Money Behind the Elections, supra note 227 (stating the reported costs of the elections); Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Political Parties, supra note 227.
230. Estimated Cost of 2012 Campaign: $6 Billion, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Apr. 8, 2012), http://
www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/estimated-cost-of-2012-campaign-6billion3276.html.
231. Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 521–27 (discussing the economic motivations of corporate political speech).
232. For a discussion of the marketplace of ideas, a metaphor used in free-speech cases, see
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) and First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 792−95 (1978).
233. The Supreme Court established the Commercial Speech Doctrine in Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Cf. Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (establishing prior Supreme Court precedent that commercial
speech was not protected by the Constitution). Commercial speech includes expressions that propose
commercial transaction and which are solely tied to the speaker’s or audience’s economic interests,
or which will likely influence the commercial decisions of consumers. The most common example is
advertising goods for sale. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 812 (2005).
234. Commercial speech is recognized under the First Amendment but receives limited constitutional protection. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation
Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional? 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005) (describing the different
standards of review applied to commercial and noncommercial speech).
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Second, by interpreting the First Amendment Freedom of Association235 Clause to include for-profit corporations,236 corporations have a
derivative right to speak on behalf of their owners.237 Unlike other forms
of associations, however, shareholders lack a homogeneous set of interests and ideals238 outside of interest in economic returns; therefore, when
speaking derivatively, corporations cannot accurately represent the political and social interests of owners and investors.239
The third concern is the threat of compelled speech on behalf of
dissenting shareholders.240 Traditionally, dissenting shareholders could
use corporate democracy measures such as director elections and shareholder proxy proposals, or as a matter of last resort, choose to sell the
shares.241 But investment in mutual funds through employer-sponsored
retirement plans limits these rights because of lack of information,242
shareholder passivity,243 and limited exit rights.244 Indirect ownership
235. “The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations
of citizens, for engaging in political speech . . . .” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884
(2010).
236. “Political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less
true because the speech comes from a corporation.’” Id. (citation omitted).
237. See, e.g., id. at 900; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783.
238. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 564 (“This Article disputes the characterization of
shareholders as having interests that are fundamentally in harmony with one another.”).
239. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 231, at 528–34.
240. Id. at 535–43.
241. “Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy can be
more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative.”
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (internal citations omitted). “If and when shareholders learn that a
corporation has been spending general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can
divest.” Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. “[T]he inherent limitations of the tax law and a recent FEC interpretation of federal campaign finance law led to an unprecedented lack of political transparency in the election cycle.” A
Guide to the Current Rules for Federal Elections: What Changed in the 2010 Election Cycle,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1187%3Aa-guide-to-the-current-rules-for-federal-elections&catid=48%3Amain&I
temid=59. For example, under the federal tax code, 501(c)(3) organizations are not required to publicly disclose their donors, even if the organization engages in political speech. “This aspect of the
tax law is not new; it has just become more salient in light of the surge in spending by corporations
and outside groups in the 2010 election cycle.” Id. Disclosure of corporate contributions for political
speech are further hidden by a 2007 Federal Elections Commission formal explanation of its rules
that “groups running these election ads would have to disclose only those contributions that were
specifically designated for election ads . . . . In other words, non-disclosure is the default under the
FEC’s interpretation of the law.” Id.; cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
243. [T]he notion that investors are expected to be largely passive has become well entrenched as a matter of law and business practice. In the retail market, mutual funds operate on the assumption that most investors are not interested in getting involved in investment decisions because they are too busy or unqualified. Investors are
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complicates the traditional market-based remedies of both knowing about
how corporate money is spent (additional distance between true owners
and management) and then selling one’s stock if unhappy with the outcome.245 Additionally, exit can occur only after the speech; thus, shareholders are left without a preventative remedy against compelled, disagreeable speech.246
The tension between a right to a return on investments (or even the
simple ability to save for retirement) and the ability to support political
causes and participate in the democratic process raises a crucial point.
The conundrum of investors potentially forced to choose between economic returns and fidelity to political ideology demonstrates the comingling of economic interests with social and political concerns as
democratic participants. The number of Americans invested in the market elevates the impact of this tension. Even though mutual fund investors may experience a diluted harm if only one out of 100 companies in a
fund engages in incongruent speech, the aggregate effect of dissonant
political speech given the majority of Americans invested in the market
is hard to ignore.247
considered customers, who buy financial products, rather than active owners
of investment assets.
Richardson, supra note 108, at 603.
244. See supra notes 135−44 and accompanying text.
245. Modern technology may help make it easier to track corporate activity, including
electoral advocacy, but it is utopian to believe that it solves the problem. Most American
households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds and pension plans, which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings.
Studies show that a majority of individual investors make no trades at all during a given
year. Moreover, if the corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees the
company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the PAC or through
the general treasury.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
246. The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred; they might
have preferred to keep that corporation’s stock in their portfolio for any number of economic reasons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from selling their
shares, changing their pension plan, or the like.
Id. (emphasis added).
247. One might argue that the diluted remedy for the mutual fund investor indicates a diluted harm to the investor. How harmful can the incongruent speech be when it is only
from one firm out of one hundred composite firms comprising an index? When a significant portion of the voting population is invested in this type of investment vehicle, however, the aggregate effect of dissonant or incongruent political speech is hard to ignore . . . . Our law recognizes the value of aggregate harms in mechanisms such as class
action lawsuits and allowing a series of seemingly insignificant breaches over time to
constitute a material breach. Here too the aggregate harm of incongruent political speech
should be recognized despite the minimal effect on the rights of the individual citizenshareholder.
Tucker, supra note 231, at 542–43.
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Infusing public debates with private dollars blurs the lines between
the public and private functions of corporations. An election stream infused with corporate money is the original context in which I first used
the phrase citizen shareholder as a means to capture the bifurcated interests between economic and democratic rights.248 The phrase has been
expanded here to represent the full scope of interests held by the majority
of investors who enter the market in mutual funds through employersponsored defined contribution plans. The number of citizens invested in
the market this way underscores the need for a modernized conceptualization of the shareholder that can take into account the relationship between economic, social, and political interests.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Departing from the corporate law perspective of internal organization and examining the agency paradigm from the perspective of the majority of American investors reveals that the traditional agency model is
broken. A litmus test for corporate action is whether or not corporate action serves shareholder interests. The traditional agency paradigm seeks
to align the actions of corporate management with shareholders, but that
paradigm and the rules developed under it are based on the notion of an
individual, direct shareholder.249 The current agency paradigm excludes
the interests of indirect owners and consequently excludes most American investors. Premising corporate law theories and remedies on a model
that excludes a majority of American investors evokes anti-democratic
concerns and seems counterintuitive.
The citizen shareholder should be incorporated into the agency paradigm for three reasons. First, a majority of modern investors enter the
market and purchase mutual funds through employer-sponsored defined
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. The data regarding modern investments and policy changes to 401(k) plan administration, like auto248. Id. at 502 n.14; Anne M. Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2011).
249. The shareholders in whose interests corporations must speak are not the human beings who own (or, more often, on whose behalf other institutions own) the shares. Indeed,
they are not citizens at all, but rather moments in the market, legal abstractions that have
interests quite different from those of real citizens in their full complexity. Unlike real
people, the fictional shareholder is an entirely one-sided abstraction; it seeks to increase
the value of its shares without regard for any other value. Corporations, then, when they
act as they are supposed to, pursue only one goal of the many that are important in a civilized society. Corporate agents, in short, work for a principle, not a principal.
Greenwood, supra note 74, at 1003.
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matic enrollment, indicate that this trend has a long trajectory and that
the majority threshold will quickly be surpassed by increasingly more
investors.
Second, there are structural constraints in this type of investment
that weaken, and in some cases, eliminate rights intended to protect
shareholders and serve as a check on mismanagement. Mutual fund investors have limited voting, exit, and information rights. As more investors are grouped in a class of assets with the least mechanisms for choice
and accountability, one must question the current power balance struck
in corporate law. Additionally, the nature of what one owns as a mutual
fund investor is different from what one owns as a direct shareholder so
that indirect owners bear the risk of ownership (i.e., market decline)
without the benefit of traditional shareholder rights. These differences
may make mutual fund holders more concerned with market performance as a whole, and more hostile to externalities and risk exposure
than a direct shareholder.
Third, corporations perform increasingly public functions that blur
the lines between public and private, and intertwine economic, social,
and political interests. Corporate actions have decidedly political and
social consequences for both investors and non-investors alike. These
consequences elevate the importance of adequately representing the
rights of indirect investors in the agency paradigm. With a majority of
households invested in private entities that serve public functions, accountability is paramount.
This Article urges a modernization of the traditional agency paradigm by adopting language that reflects the unique interests of modern
investors: mutual fund holders in employer-sponsored plans—the citizen
shareholders. When analyzing whether corporate actions serve the interests of investors, the agency paradigm must incorporate these indirect
owners’ interests. Such interests include a preference for policies and
actions that support broad market performance rather than those that
promote excessive risk taking or creating externalities. Additionally, expanding the shareholder identity to include the citizen shareholders modernizes the language and captures the scope of investments, the purposes
served, and the consequences of corporate action that are broader than
the daily rise or fall of an individual company (or fund) share price.250
250. The final chapter in Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property
focused on this very point. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 352–57 (“More slow, but equally sure
is the development of social pressure demanding that the [corporate] power shall be used for the
benefit of all concerns. This pressure, constant in ecclesiastical and political history, is already making its appearance in many guises in the economic field.”); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note
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Corporate law scholarship has long advocated for incorporating such interests;251 this Article suggests that one way to incorporate these broader
interests is to reconceptualize the identity of the shareholder within the
traditional agency paradigm. Thus, the definition of shareholder expands
and the framework evolves to reflect the investment realities for a majority of American investors.
At this stage, the approach of the citizen shareholder is conceptual,
not procedural, and is a starting point for thinking about how to infuse
traditional corporate law models with current economic realities. Perhaps
more importantly, this project looks outside the walls of corporations and
asks how and why individuals invest in the market and how can (or
should) corporate law respect, incorporate, and serve the interests of
modern investors. Current corporate law debates are largely divorced
from the reality of how over 90 million Americans who, typically
through a system of confined choice and encouraged by tax incentives,
link their individual financial security with private, corporate actions.
The implicit trust placed upon corporate actions by both individuals investing in this fashion and our society as a whole merits the acknowledgment and inclusion of those interests within the agency paradigm.
Conceptualizing this class of 401(k) investors as the citizen shareholder,
and modernizing the agency paradigm to accommodate these investors’
interests—primarily in market stability to secure retirement savings—is a
step in the right direction.

34, at 851–52 (describing the evolution of Berle’s vision of the form and function of corporations to
one where corporate entities had social responsibilities, even though how such duties would be incorporated into the governance model was not then clear).
251. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 8; see also Ho, supra note 8; Taub, supra note 5, at
860 (“[T]hose with a stakeholder perspective see corporate accountability more broadly. They would
claim that corporations need to serve all important stakeholders, beyond just shareholders . . . employees, suppliers, customers, the local community, the environment, future generations, and perhaps anyone impacted significantly by externalities resulting from corporate operations.”).
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Appendix
Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010
Rank Economy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

United States
China
Japan
Germany
France
United
Kingdom
Brazil
Italy
India
Canada
Russian
Federation

GDP/
Rank Economy
Revenue252
14,582,400 24 Wal-Mart Stores
5,878,629 25 Venezuela, RB
5,497,813 26 Austria
3,309,669 27 Saudi Arabia
2,560,002 28 Argentina

GDP/
Revenue
408,214
387,852
376,162
375,766
368,712

2,246,079

29

South Africa

363,704

2,087,890
2,051,412
1,729,010
1,574,052

30
31
32
33

Iran, Islamic Rep.
Thailand
Denmark
Greece

331,015
318,847
310,405
304,865

1,479,819

34

Colombia

288,189

12

Spain

1,407,405

35

13
14
15
16

Mexico
Korea, Rep.
Australia
Netherlands

1,039,662
1,014,483
924,843
783,413

36
37
38
39

17

Turkey

735,264

40

18

Indonesia

706,558

41

19

Switzerland

523,772

42

20
21
22
23

Poland
Belgium
Sweden
Norway

468,585
467,472
458,004
414,462

43
44
45
46

Royal Dutch
Shell
Exxon Mobil
BP
Finland
Malaysia
United Arab
Emirates
Portugal
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Singapore
Egypt, Arab Rep.
Israel
Toyota Motor

285,129
284,650
246,106
238,801
237,804
230,252
228,538
224,458
222,699
218,912
217,334
204,106

252. Revenue listed in millions of U.S. dollars. Gross domestic product 2010, WORLD BANK
(July 1, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (Ranking national economies by millions of U.S. dollars); Global 500 List, CNN MONEY (July 26, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/. Ranking compiled by author;
corporate revenue confirmed for U.S.-traded companies based on 10K filings in 2011 for year-end
2010 (on file with the author).
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Rank Economy
47

Ireland

48

Chile

GDP/
Rank Economy
Revenue
203,892 73 New Zealand
Assicurazioni
203,443 74
Generali

1357
GDP/
Revenue
126,679
126,012

50
51
52
53

Japan Post
Holdings
Philippines
Nigeria
Czech Republic
Sinopec

54

State Grid

184,496

80

55
56

175,257
174,799

81
82

165,496

83

58
59

AXA
Pakistan
China National
Petroleum
Chevron
ING Group

163,527
163,204

84
85

60

Romania

161,624

86

61

Algeria

159,426

87

62
63

General Electric
Total S.A.

156,779
155,887

88
89

64

Peru

153,845

90

150,450

91

Crédit Agricole

106,538

146,205
148,024
142,987
139,515
137,929

92
93
94
95
96

Banco Santander
General Motors
HSBC Holdings
Siemens
Vietnam
American
International
Group (AIG)
Lloyds Banking
Group

106,345
104,589
103,736
103,605
103,572

49

57

202,196

75

Allianz

125,999

199,589
193,669
192,152
187,518

76
77
78
79

AT&T
Carrefour
Ford Motor
ENI
J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co.
Hewlett-Packard
E.ON
Berkshire
Hathaway
GDF Suez
Daimler
Nippon Telegraph
& Telephone
Samsung
Electronics
Citigroup
McKesson
Verizon
Communications

123,018
121,452
118,308
117,235

66
67
68
69
70

Bank of America
Corp.
Volkswagen
Kuwait
Kazakhstan
ConocoPhillips
Ukraine

71

BNP Paribas

130,708

97

72

Hungary

130,419

98

65

115,632
114,552
113,849
112,493
111,069
109,700
109,656
108,927
108,785
108,702
107,808

103,189
102,967
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Rank Economy
99
100
101
102

Bangladesh
Cardinal Health
Nestlé
CVS Caremark

103 Wells Fargo
104 Qatar
105 Hitachi
International
106 Business
Machines (IBM)
107 Dexia Group
108 Gazprom
109 Honda Motor
Electricité de
110
France
111 Aviva
112 Petrobras
113

Royal Bank of
Scotland

114 Morocco
115 PDVSA
116 Metro
117 Tesco
Deutsche
118
Telekom
119 Enel
120 Slovak Republic
United Health
Group
122 Angola
123 Société Générale
121

GDP/
Revenue
100,076
99,613
99,114
98,729
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Rank Economy
124
125
126
127

Iraq
Nissan Motor
Pemex
Panasonic
Proctor &
98,636 128
Gamble
98,313 129 LG
96,593 130 Telefónica

GDP/
Revenue
82,150
80,963
80,722
79,893
79,697
78,892
78,853

95,758 131 Sony

77,696

95,144 132 Kroger
94,472 133 Groupe BPCE
92,400 134 Prudential

76,733
76,464
75,010

92,204 135 Munich Re Group

74,764

92,140 136 Statoil
Nippon Life
91,869 137
Insurance
AmerisourceBer91,767 138
gen
China Mobile
91,196 a 139
Communications
91,182 140 Hyundai Motor
Costco
91,152 141
Wholesale
90,234 142 Vodafone

74,000
72,051
71,789
71,749
71,678
71,422
70,899

89,794 143 BASF

70,461

89,329 144 BMW
Zurich Financial
89,034 145
Services

70,444
70,272

87,123 146 Valero Energy

70,035

84,391 147 Fiat
84,157 148 Deutsche Post

69,639
69,427
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Rank Economy
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Industrial &
Commercial
Bank of China
Archer Daniels
Midland
Toshiba
Legal & General
Group
Boeing
U.S. Postal
Service
Lukoil

GDP/
Rank Economy
Revenue

1359
GDP/
Revenue

69,295 156 Peugeot

67,297

69,207 157 CNP Assurances

66,556

68,731 158 Barclays

66,533

68,290 159 Home Depot

66,176

68,281 160 Target

65,357

68,090 161 ArcelorMittal

65,110

68,025 162 WellPoint

65,028
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Table 8: Top 100 Corporations by Revenue in 2010
Rank Company

Revenues253

1
2
3
4
5

Wal-Mart Stores
Royal Dutch Shell
Exxon Mobil
BP
Toyota Motor

408,214
285,129
284,650
246,106
204,106

6

Japan Post Holdings

202,196

7
8
9
10
11

Sinopec Financial
Holdings Co. Ltd.
State Grid Corp. of China
AXA
China National
Petroleum
Chevron

187,518

Stock
Exchange254
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange

184,496 Gov’t Owned
175,257 NYSE Euronext
Not on U.S.
165,496
exchange
163,527 NYSE

253. Revenue is listed in millions of U.S. dollars. Global 500 List, supra note 252. Ranking
compiled by author; corporate revenue confirmed for U.S.-traded companies based on 10K filings in
2011 for year-end 2010 (on file with the author).
254. Exchange listing information obtained from exchange-based databases of listing companies. Exchanges searched included the NYSE Euronext, Listing Directory, NYSE EURONEXT (2012),
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_name_A.html?ListedComp, as well as the NASDAQ,
Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, & AMEX), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companylist.aspx. Data compiled by author.
A securities exchange is a U.S.-registered exchange if it files with the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Section 6 of the 1934 Act:
An exchange may be registered as a national securities exchange under the terms and
conditions hereinafter provided in this section and in accordance with the provisions of
section 19(a) of this title, by filing with the Commission an application for registration in
such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the rules of the exchange and such other information and documents as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78f (2010). Registered securities exchanges include the following: NYSE Amex; BATS
Exchange, Inc.; BATS Y. Exchange, Inc.; NASDAQ OMX-BX, Inc. (formerly Boston); C2 Options
Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.; EDGA
Exchange, Inc.; EDGX Exchange, Inc.; International SEC Exchange, LLC; the Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC; National Stock Exchange, Inc.; New York Stock Exchange, LLC (referred to in Table 8 as
the “NYSE”); NYSE Arca, Inc.; and NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. (formerly Philadelphia Stock
Exchange). Exchanges, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divi
sions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml. For a complete listing of international stock exchanges, see
Aldas Kirvaitis, Stock Exchanges Worldwide Links, http://www.tdd.lt/slnews/Stock_Exchanges
/Stock.Exchanges.htm (last visited May 8, 2012).
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Revenues253

12
13
14
15

ING Group
General Electric
Total S.A.
Bank of America Corp.

163,204
156,779
155,887
150,450

16

Volkswagen

146,205

17
18
19

Conoco Phillips
BNP Paribas
Assicurazioni Generali

139,515
130,708
126,012

20

Allianz

125,999

21
22
23
24
25
26

AT&T
Carrefour
Ford Motor
ENI
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.
Hewlett-Packard

123,018
121,452
118,308
117,235
115,632
114,552

27

E.ON

113,849
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Stock
Exchange254
Euronext
NYSE
NYSE Euronext
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
NYSE Euronext
MP
ADR255
on NYSE
NYSE
Euronext
NYSE
ADR on NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange

255. ADR stands for American Depository Receipt:
ADRs can be called American Depository Receipts, Global Depository Receipts . . . . A
security issued by a depository against a deposit of stock held in the local marketplace . . . . [W]hen we’re talking about an ADR, we’re talking about a security where the
ADR and the ADS is registered with the SEC, at least marginally, and trades publicly in
the United States . . . .
Remarks of Harry Wellington, Dean of the New York Law School, The Russian Securities Markets:
Regulation and Practice, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (1998); see also ADR Basics:
What is an ADR?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/adr/adr1.asp#axzz1m6
ZODLIU (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (“An American depository receipt (ADR) is a stock that trades
in the United States but represents a specified number of shares in a foreign corporation. ADRs are
bought and sold on American markets just like regular stocks, and are issued/sponsored in the U.S.
by a bank or brokerage.”).
Additionally, some foreign-owned securities are referred to as American Depository Shares or
ADS:
A U.S. dollar-denominated equity share of a foreign-based company available
for purchase on an American stock exchange. American Depositary Shares (ADSs) are
issued by depository banks in the U.S. under agreement with the issuing foreign company; the entire issuance is called an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and the individual shares are referred to as ADSs.
American Depository Share—ADS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/ads.asp#ix
zz1m6aBMcqD (last visited May 8, 2012).
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Stock
Exchange254
112,493 NYSE
111,069 NYSE Euronext
Not on U.S.
109,700
exchange

Revenues253

28
29

Berkshire Hathaway
GDF Suez

30

Daimler

31

Nippon Telegraph &
Telephone

109,656 NYSE

32

Samsung Electronics

108,927

33
34

49

Citigroup
McKesson
Verizon
Communications
Crédit Agricole
Banco Santander
General Motors
HSBC Holdings
Siemens
American International
Group (AIG)
Lloyds Banking Group
Cardinal Health
Nestlé
CVS Caremark
Wells Fargo
Hitachi
International Business
Machines (IBM)
Dexia Group

50

Gazprom

51

Honda Motor

52
53

Electricité de France
Aviva

54

Petrobras

55

Royal Bank of Scotland

56

PDVSA

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Not on U.S.
exchange
108,785 NYSE
108,702 NYSE

107,808 NYSE
106,538
106,345
104,589
103,736
103,605

NYSE Euronext
NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
ADR on NYSE

103,189 NYSE
102,967
99,613
99,114
98,729
98,636
96,593

NYSE
NYSE
ADR on NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
ADR on NYSE

95,758 NYSE
95,144 Euronext
Not on U.S.
94,472
exchange
Not on U.S.
92,400
exchange
92,204 Euronext
92,140 NYSE
Not on U.S.
91,869
exchange
91,767 ADR by NYSE
Not on U.S.
91,182
exchange
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Revenues253

57

Metro A.G.

91,152

58

Tesco

90,234

59

Deutsche Telekom

89,794

60

Enel

89,329

61

United Health Group

87,138

62

Société Générale

84,157

63
64
65
66

Nissan Motor
Pemex
Panasonic
Proctor & Gamble

80,963
80,722
79,893
79,697

67

LG

78,892

68
69
70
71
72

Telefónica
Sony
Kroger
Groupe BPCE
Prudential

78,853
77,696
76,733
76,464
75,010

73

Munich Re Group

74,764

74

Statoil

74,000

75

Nippon Life Insurance

72,051

76

AmericsourceBergen
China Mobile Communications

71,789

77

71,749

78

Hyundai Motor

71,678

79
80

Costco Wholesale
Vodafone

71,422
70,899

81

BASF

70,461

82

BMW

70,444

1363
Stock
Exchange254
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
ARS on
Euronext
OTC by ADR
Gov’t owned
NYSE
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
ADR by NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
Privately owned
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
NASDAQ
NASDAQ
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
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84
85

Zurich Financial Services
A.G.
Valero Energy
Fiat

86

Deutsche Post

83

Revenues253
70,272
70,035
69,639
69,427

88

Industrial & Commercial
Bank of China
Archer Daniels Midland

89

Toshiba

68,731

90

Legal & General Group

68,290

91
92

Boeing
U.S. Postal Service

68,281
68,090

93

Lukoil

68,025

94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Peugeot
CNP Assurances
Barclays
Home Depot
Target
ArcelorMittal
WellPoint

67,297
66,556
66,533
66,176
65,357
65,110
65,028

87

69,295
69,207
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Stock
Exchange254
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
ADR on NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
Not on U.S.
exchange
Not on U.S.
exchange
NYSE
Gov’t owned
Not on U.S.
exchange
Euronext
Euronext
ADR on NYSE
NYSE
NYSE
Euronext
NYSE
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Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional
Investors in Case Study Companies256
Wal-Mart Stores
Institutional
Investors257

IBM
Institutional
Investors

WellPoint
Institutional
Investors

1. Vanguard
(86M shares)
3. Berkshire Hathaway
4. BlackRock258
8. Fidelity
11. BlackRock
13. BlackRock
14. Bank of America
16. Legal & General
Group
18. JP Morgan Chase
20. TIAA-CREF
21. CALPERS

1. Berkshire Hathaway
(64M shares)
3. Vanguard
4. Blackrock
8. Fidelity
10. BlackRock
11. Bank of America
12. JP Morgan Chase

2. Vanguard
(15.15M shares)
3. Fidelity
7. BlackRock
9. Oppenheimer
10. T. Rowe Price
14. BlackRock
18. BlackRock

13. BlackRock

24. BlackRock

14. TIAA-CREF
20. BlackRock
22. T. Rowe Price
25. Legal & General
Group
36. Wells Fargo
38. N.Y. State
Common Ret. Fund

30. TIAA-CREF
32. Bank of America
43. BlackRock
47. Legal & General
Group
48. JP Morgan Chase
49. N.Y. State
Common Ret. Fund

40. CALPERS

53. CALPERS

43. N.Y. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.

61. BlackRock

26. T. Rowe Price
29. BlackRock
33. N.Y. State
Common Ret. Fund
41. N.Y. Teachers’
Ret. Sys.
45. AXA

256. These data reflected in this table were hand-collected by the author based on publicly
available 13f filings for the case study companies. (on file with author).
257. Institutional investors are listed in rank order by size of holdings, from largest to smallest
until the cut-off threshold of 200,000 shares of the company is met. The number next to the institutional investor name indicates the rank of that investor among all institutional investors, not just
those included in this table. Institutional investors included in this table are (a) one of the top 100
companies, (b) one of the top mutual funds discussed in this Article, or (c) a pension fund associated
with a state or municipal government in the U.S.
258. Note, there are several different BlackRock funds, and as well other institutional investors, that hold stock under different registered entities operating under the corporate parent umbrella.
For purposes of this table, the parent company is identified and given a separate entry for each 13F
filing that demonstrated holdings over 200,000 shares in the case study companies in 2010.

1366

Seattle University Law Review

Wal-Mart Stores
Institutional
Investors

IBM
Institutional
Investors

50. Allianz

48. BlackRock

64. Fla. State Bd. of
Admin.
66. Cal. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.
68. Wells Fargo
69. BlackRock
75. BlackRock
79. State of Wis. Inv.
Bd.

WellPoint
Institutional
Investors

53. Fla. State Bd. of
Admin.
58. AXA
59. Cal. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.
63. Oppenheimer
Funds

68. N.Y. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.
72. State Teachers Ret.
Sys. of Ohio
94. Cal. State
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.
98. AXA
103. State of Wis. Inv.
Bd.
111. Emps. Ret. Sys.
of Tex.

66. BlackRock

114. HSBC

52. Citigroup

67. State of Wis. Inv.
Bd.
90. Wells Fargo
70. Wells Fargo
91. Citigroup
75. Credit Agricolé
79. Ohio Pub. Emps.
99. BlackRock
Ret. Sys.
106. Credit Agricolé
80. BlackRock
109. State of N.J.
81. State Teachers’
Common Pension Fund Ret. Sys. of Ohio
112. Ohio Pub. Emp.
82. HSBC
Ret. Sys.
113. State Teachers’
88. Colo. Pub. Emps.’
Ret. Sys. of Ohio
Ret. Ass’n
116. HSBC
89. N.J. Div. of Inv.
127. Oppenheimer
95. General Electric
Fund
133. Tex. Teacher Ret.
99. Allianz
Sys.
137. Va. Ret. Sys.
111. BNP
146. State Treasurer of 120. Royal Bank of
Mich.
Scotland
151. Colo. Pub. Emps.’ 124. Tex. Teacher Ret.
Ret. Ass’n
Sys.
83. ING
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123. Ohio Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys.
129. Credit Agricolé
134. Wells Fargo
145. State of N.J.
Common Pension Fund
151. Barclays
172. AXA
183. Colo. Pub. Emps.’
Ret. Ass’n
191. Tex. Permanent
Sch. Fund
196. ING
198. State Treasurer of
Mich.

2012]

The Citizen Shareholder

Wal-Mart Stores
Institutional
Investors

IBM
Institutional
Investors

159. Tex. Permanent
Sch. Fund

125. ING

129. Tex. Permanent
Sch. Fund
173. IBM
130. IBM
197. Emps. Ret. Sys. of 144. State Treasurer of
Tex.
Mich.
229. Pub. Sector
146. Emps. Ret. Sys. of
Pension Inv. Bd.
Tex.
236. Royal Bank of
171. AIG
Scotland
200. Ky. Teachers’
242. AIG
Ret. Sys.
204. Commonwealth
245. INC
of Pa. Pub. Schs.
246. Commonwealth
236. Allianz
of Pa. Pub. Schs.
249. Exxon
256. BNP
262. Fidelity
273. AIG
275. Allianz
275. Va. Ret. Sys.
283. Ky. Teachers’
Ret. Sys.
308. N.M. Educ. Ret.
Bd.
309. BP
341. AXA
343. AIG
355. Or. Pub. Emps.
Ret. Sys.
377. Wells Fargo
389. BNP
391. Wells Fargo
169. Allianz
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